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I. INTRODUCTION
The perception that dominant enterprises sometimes use
predatory tactics-most notably below-cost pricing-to achieve
and extend monopoly power is a fixture in the lore of antitrust law.
Professor Sullivan, for example, has observed that in the late nine-
teenth century "the predatory monopolist became a figure in the
national demonology."1 Congress passed the antitrust laws partly
in response to the fear that the gigantic trusts, if unchecked, would
abuse their dominance and develop and exploit monopoly power.2
1. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 109 (1977). See also Cassady &
Brown, Exclusionary Tactics in American Business Competition: An Historical Analysis, 8
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 88 (1961).
2. In the debates on the then proposed Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38
Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), Senator
Reed illustrated his arguments favoring the legislation with a predatory pricing
hypothetical:
Another practice calculated not to benefit the purchaser, but to destroy competition is
well illustrated in certain practices attributed to the Standard Oil Co. It has been
charged that the company goes into a trade territory which is occupied by a rival, drops
the price of its products below their actual cost, and thus crushes and destroys the
competitor, meantime selling in other communities at a higher price and gaining profits
there, and out of those profits gained in other places sustaining itself, while it is selling
goods at a loss in the community where their rival is located. When he is crushed it
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If the volume of current predation cases and theoretical analyses
provides any indication, the perception of predation is not a relic
of legal history.
Despite this long-standing concern with predatory practices, a
substantial divergence exists between the theoretical literature an-
alyzing predation-especially the recent economic literature-and
the actual attempts of courts to identify and redress this conduct.
This is hardly surprising. A consensus has yet to emerge within
either the legal or economic communities about what in theory or
in law should constitute predation. While recent judicial analyses
are becoming increasingly rooted in economic theory,' courts none-
theless must temper theoretical economic concerns with eviden-
tiary, procedural, and jurisprudential considerations. Indeed, one
reasonably may question how well even a broadly accepted eco-
nomic definition of predation can be applied in the typical court-
room environment of incomplete facts, disputed interpretations,
unsettled theories, and limited economic expertise.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, courts still must somehow
address the allegations of unlawful predatory conduct with which
they are presented. This Article examines the recent judicial expe-
rience in this endeavor. The purposes of the Article are twofold.
The first is to describe the current state of the law regarding pre-
dation and to discern significant trends that may be developing.
The second purpose is to explore the considerations that courts
must weigh in evaluating the legal utility of proposed rules that
may be valid as a matter of economic theory. Toward these ends,
part II of the Article examines the economic and legal context in
which litigants present predation claims. Specifically, this part re-
views some of the academic debates that have so greatly influenced
recent courtroom developments, the statutory framework within
which these developments have occurred, and the legacy of Utah
puts up the price. Now, that could be condemned under the provision I have drawn.
51 CONG. REc. 13231 (1914). See also Dialogue between Representatives Cooper and Ste-
vens, 51 CONG. REc. 14936-37 (1914).
In the same year that Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914, it also
passed the Clayton Act. Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits predatory geographic price
discrimination. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1976)). Congress subsequently amended and broadened this provision by enacting the
Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b,
21a (1976)).
3. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d
917 (9th Cir. 1981); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
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Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,4 which is the Supreme Court's
most recent predation decision. Part III then explores the stan-
dards that courts are applying in the three principal predation
contexts-pricing, innovation, and promotion.
Finally, part IV examines certain patterns of judicial analysis
that are apparent in fifty-seven cases decided during and after
1975, the year in which Professors Areeda and Turner published
their seminal article on predatory pricing. These patterns are im-
portant and predictive, for they reflect the courts' views about
both the frequency and competitive dangers of predation and the
administrative costs of attempting to control it. This examination
also includes a table summarizing the outcomes of these
cases-who won, in which types of cases, at what procedural
stage-and a discussion of some economic and administrative con-
siderations underlying those outcomes.' Overall, the analysis in
this Article reveals both the legal trends in one specific area of an-
titrust law-predation-and, more broadly, the methods by which
scholarly and judicial analyses can build upon one another to pro-
mote more rapid development of an evolving field of legal inquiry.
II. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Battle of the Antitrust Titans8
The traditional concept of predation was first and foremost a
legal notion based primarily on analysis of the dominant firm's in-
4. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
5. The best known and most frequently discussed form of predatory conduct, preda-
tory pricing, refers to the use of below-cost sales to drive rivals from the market or limit
their competitive initiatives. Although matters of periodic concern, predatory innovation
and promotion represent less clearly established categories of business behavior. For the
purposes of this Article, predatory innovation describes a firm's purposeful manipulation of
product design or other use of its research and development resources to prevent existing or
potential rivals from challenging its market position. Predatory promotion encompasses the
use of advertising or other promotional devices to eliminate or constrain competitors.
6. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HAnv. L. REV. 697 (1975).
7. This survey includes only those cases in which pricing, innovation, or promotion
were central elements of the plaintiff's predation claims, and in which the court expressly
addressed the substantive propriety of the defendant's conduct. A list of the cases surveyed
is contained in Appendix A. See also notes 292-329 infra and accompanying text. For an
explanation of how the cases were selected, see note 294 supra. The statistics upon which
this Article relies refer to the status of the investigated cases as of October 2, 1981.
8. In discussing recent academic literature on predatory pricing Judge Tuttle observed
that the "classic battle among the titans of the antitrust world rages still." Malcolm v. Mar-
athon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 854 n.17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec.
14, 1981) (No. 81-874).
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tent and on the competitive effect of its conduct.9 Although intent
and effect are still legally relevant-indeed critical-to an evalua-
tion of alleged instances of predation, antitrust scholars and indus-
trial organization economists have virtually reformulated the con-
cept. They have argued for a more economically informed view of
what should constitute an unlawful purpose and an undesirable re-
sult. These theoretical works now deeply affect the way in which
courts analyze allegations of predatory conduct.10 This section,
therefore, provides an overview of the scholarly debate to lay a
foundation for reviewing and understanding the recent trends in
the courts.
Before examining the various arguments in this debate, how-
ever, one important point of agreement should be emphasized: The
general dynamic of predation itself. Professor Sullivan articulated
this common theme as follows:
By contrast [with competitive conduct], the predator seeks not to win the
field by greater efficiency, better services, or lower prices reflective of cost
savings or modest profits. The predatory firm tries to inhibit others in ways
independent of the predator's own ability to perform effectively in the mar-
ket. Its price reduction or predatory expenditure is calculated to impose
losses on other firms, not to garner gains for itself; indeed, the predation is
likely to involve present losses to the predator, or at all events to foreclose
profits which could currently be earned, detriments which are accepted by
the predator as the cost of freeing itself for the future from the competition it
now faces.11
With this observation-emphasizing the trade-off of short-
term losses for greater long-term gains-industrial organization
economists and other students of business behavior can examine a
course of conduct to determine whether the intent to make such a
trade-off, and the likelihood of success, exist.12 The proper focus,
however, is not merely on the trade-off of short-term profits for
long-term gains; all major investment programs and research and
development activities have this characteristic. Nor is the proper
focus simply on the desire to be free of effective competition, since
9. See Cassady & Brown, supra note 1, at 88. See generally United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
11. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 111 (footnotes omitted). Sullivan observed that pre-
dation generally displays two characteristics: It will not appear as "honestly industrial" bus-
iness conduct to the informed observer, and it will have a specific rival or potential competi-
tor as a target. Id. at 111-12.
12. This approach assumes that businesses can predict as well as anyone else the prob-
able consequences of their actions. It also assumes that an intent to make lawfully the maxi-
mum possible amount of profits normally guides business conduct.
1982]
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all business managers seek to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to
their shareholders by striving to outperform competitors, occupy
their markets, and enjoy monopoly profits. The problem arises
when these two factors are causally linked. While shrewd, long-
term investment at the expense of short-term gains ultimately may
lead to the outperformance and eventual demise of competitors, it
is predatory only when its sole economic justification depends on
that result. Thus, Professor Bork has defined predation as a
"firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the
employment of business practices that would not be considered
profit maximizing" except for two expectations:13 Either the con-
duct will drive competitors from the market, which would give the
predator a sufficient market share to command monopoly profits,
or the competitors will, through fear or a renewed spirit of cooper-
ation, "abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconve-
nient or threatening"
1 4
Although Professors Joskow and Klevorick arrive at policy
conclusions that differ markedly from Professor Bork's,15 they view
the dynamic of predation in much the same way. These authors
conclude that predatory conduct entails a short-term price reduc-
tion which is designed either to drive rivals out of the market or to
13. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 144 (1978).
14. Id.
15. See note 60 infra and accompanying text. Although commentators seldom like to
be classified into schools, in current antitrust parlance the labels "Chicago school" and
"Harvard school" have become a commonly used shorthand to denote groupings of distinc-
tive philosophical and professional perspectives. Many of the controversies and policy dis-
agreements in the predation debate may be traced to differences in underlying assumptions.
For example, one important philosophical difference between these two schools is whether
the antitrust laws should be, or were intended to be, concerned with goals other than achiev-
ing the most efficient allocation of wealth to the satisfaction of consumer demand. These
goals, which some Harvard school adherents regard as a rightful element of antitrust policy
analysis, include protecting small business and avoiding great aggregations of economic
power-and the accompanying political and social power-in the hands of a few. Prominent
among the professional disagreements are whether dominant firms can deter market entry
or expansion through means other than collusion, efficient competitive behavior, or market
distortions caused by government intervention. Harvard school proponents tend to feel that
firms can erect, maintain, and exploit nonefficiency-related entry barriers to shelter and ex-
tend market power. For one description of these two schools which suggests that they are
converging, see Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 926
(1979). For a contrasting view, see Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 949 (1979). For recent, thorough discussions of the goals of the antitrust laws, see Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming)
(emphasizing the preservation of opportunities to compete), and Lande, The Goals of the




discourage the entry of new firms. They maintain that the predator
in the long run intends to raise prices and reap higher profits than
he would have earned had the original price reduction never oc-
curred. 16 According to Joskow and Klevorick,
The predator expects that its entry-impeding, exit-inducing strategy will
enable it to maintain an existing market structure in which prices are above
competitive levels for a longer period of time than would be possible if entry
were allowed to occur immediately. In either case, the firm pursuing such a
strategy does so in the expectation that long-run profits will increase more
than enough to compensate for what has been sacrificed in the short-run.
17
This consensus, while limited in scope, is important because it
gives courts, business managers, and others a framework within
which to examine business conduct. Furthermore, the view has
stimulated deeper inquiry into formerly settled assumptions about
predation. The traditional approach held that a large firm with a
"deep pocket" could subdue smaller rivals by pricing below cost.
According to this view, the dominant firm could afford the expense
and outlast the challenger. With its competitors eliminated, the
dominant firm would have monopoly power and could raise its
prices with impunity. Moreover, the predatory conduct's success
would yield monopoly profits that in turn could subsidize further
predatory activity, if the monopolist so desired.
The shift in analytical focus from the ultimate legal issues of
purpose and effect to the underlying market dynamics reveals that
pricing below cost does not invariably result in the economic harm
that the traditional view once assumed. Profits and losses do not
flow with certainty. Indeed, total losses from a price war may be
higher for the predator than they are for its victim. This situation
can occur because the dominant firm's successful, predatory below-
cost pricing strategy, while giving it a larger and ever expanding
share of the market, causes it to lose money or forego profits on
every unit. By contrast, the challenger or entrant can cut produc-
tion, or even mothball its plant, and then wait. When the predator
seeks to recoup its losses by pricing above competitive levels, the
challenger may return and renew its assault. In addition, high
prices, after some time lag, may attract other firms to the market;
capital arguably should be available for this purpose, since lenders
presumably would finance entry or reentry attempts into a market
in which their borrowers almost certainly would share in monopoly
16. Joskow & KIevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89
YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979).
17. Id. at 220.
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profits. Finally, even if the victim goes bankrupt, another firm
likely would acquire its assets and assume anew the role of market
challenger. The dominant firm, of course, should be able to fore-
cast this entire scenario. If so, it probably would find, ex ante, that
traditional deep-pocket predation would not pay unless substantial
barriers to entry and reentry insulate its resulting monopoly posi-
tion from future attack.18
Although scholars agree on the general dynamics of predation
and on the notion that the traditional concept of deep-pocket pre-
dation, without more, does not describe a serious problem, no con-
sensus exists among them on the other issues in this complex field
of law. The current predation debate focuses on a series of com-
pound questions: (1) Does predation occur in practice, and if it
does, in what form, and with what frequency? (2) If predation ex-
ists, what dangers to competition result from both the predatory
conduct itself and the efforts to limit or redress that conduct? and
(3) In light of the answers to these questions, how may the courts
optimally address the issue of predation? The antitrust theorists
vigorously disagree on the appropriate answers to each of these
questions, with enlightening-though not dispositive-results. 19
18. For summaries of this argument, see R. BORK, supra note 13, at 144-60, and Eas-
terbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981).
Beyond challenging the traditional concept of deep-pocket predation from a theoretical
standpoint, some scholars also have questioned it on empirical grounds. Professor McGee's
reexamination of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was one of the most
influential of these criticisms. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958). See also Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An
Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971). Professor Scherer, however,
argues that McGee's and Koller's analyses are faulty because of inadequate factual support.
He notes, for example, that independent historical evidence strongly suggests that John D.
Rockefeller personally suggested that Standard Oil seriously consider forcing rivals from the
market through price cutting if Standard's market share were to decline below fifty percent.
Scherer also points.to theoretical evidence which shows that, under certain conditions, be-
low-cost pricing can be long-term, profit-maximizing behavior for a dominant firm. These
conditions arise when the dominant firm's cost advantage is great, and fringe firms, there-
fore, are likely to exit the market quickly in the face of price cutting. F. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 336-38 (2d ed. 1980) (citing A. NEv-
INS, STUDY IN PowEm JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER (1953) and Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Optimal
Pricing by Dominant Firms 12-22 (1970) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of
Michigan)). On balance, Scherer finds the evidence that deep-pocket predation is rare to be
persuasive, if predation is not defined expansively to include efforts to discipline rivals, to
rebuff entry by firms still seeking to acquire a market base, or to reap benefits across many
markets. Id. at 337-40.
19. For a discussion of how the courts have addressed these questions, see part III
infra. The inquiries, of course, present issues that are interrelated. Thus, the frequency and
forms of predation could well be considered along with the question of the competitive harm
from predatory activity. Similarly, the potential undesirable side effects of attempts to cur-
[Vol. 35:63
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The argument about whether predation actually exists to any
significant extent is largely a function of the disagreement over
what, if anything, constitutes a barrier to market entry.20 Clearly, a
firm must overcome many obstacles to challenge a market leader
successfully. Although all these hurdles are to some extent entry
barriers, many of them-for example, economies of scale-reflect
efficiencies that enhance consumer welfare. Both theorists and
courts accord these efficiency-generated advantages substantial
deference.2 1 Indeed, the efficient incumbent arguably would not
need to incur the costs of predation, since it presumably could
compete successfully over the long term because of its own superi-
ority.22 Regardless, to proscribe as predatory any conduct or other
market conditions that enhance consumer welfare in the long run
would be ill-advised. By contrast, when the conduct or market con-
ditions do not reflect ongoing superior performance, they should be
subject to control if they either facilitate predation or protect the
monopoly power that might result from this predation. The thresh-
old theoretical task, therefore, is to distinguish those entry barriers
that promote efficiency from those that do not.
2 3
tail predation might be treated either separately or as part of the inquiry into the adminis-
trability of a proposed rule.
20. As used in this Article, the term "entry barrier" refers to barriers both to entry
and to expansion and includes not only impediments that prevent entry or expansion, but
also those that significantly reduce their magnitude and occurrence.
21. Thus, for example, whereas Williamson proposes that an established firm should
not be permitted to expand output unduly for a limited period to allow a new entrant to
"get up to speed," he would not impose any long-term proscription that would deny con-
sumers the benefits of the dominant firm's efficiencies. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A
Strategic Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Predatory Pric-
ing]. See also Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979);
note 41 infra. An initial grace period would shelter newcomers temporarily while they at-
tempt to recoup their start-up costs, and it would protect them to some extent as they
proceed down their experience curve, a term which describes the decline in a firm's per unit
costs-at an ever decreasing rate-as its cumulative output increases. See Craswell, A Sur-
vey of Antitrust Issues Raised by Some Business Strategy Models, in PAPERS ON BUSINESS
STRATEGY IN ANIITRUST (FTC Office of Policy Planning 1980).
22. Nevertheless, a dominant firm enjoying efficiency advantages may opt to use pre-
dation to make a possible "competitive kill" more probable, or to make a sure kill more
swift. Indeed, predation arguably may be desirable-especially under the latter circum-
stances-if it enables a more efficient firm to serve more rapidly a larger portion of the
market. Of course, opposing arguments can be made that the less efficient firm ultimately
may become more efficient, develop new technology, introduce process innovations, or pro-
vide actual-as opposed to potential-limits to the efficient dominant firm's exploitation of
monopoly power.
23. The kinds of conduct that scholars have identified as possible entry barriers in-
clude the following: Massive advertising, see, e.g., Comanor & Wilson, The Effect of Adver-
tising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 453 (1979); brand proliferation, see
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A detailed discussion of the entry barriers controversy is be-
yond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note that some
scholars believe that barriers which prevent or delay market entry
or expansion (other than those based on efficiency) are rarely, if
ever, present in any given market. Consequently, these commenta-
tors tend to conclude that predation rarely will occur, since it
would be economically irrational in a market with few entry barri-
ers and competitively unnecessary for a superior firm.24 Other com-
mentators, however, disagree and argue that exploitable, nonef-
ficiency-based entry barriers often do exist. They alsd maintain
that predation which exploits these barriers may take forms other
than those of the traditional deep-pocket variety.
Prominent among these suggested other forms of predation
are those that take advantage of imperfect information, particu-
larly the challenger's incomplete knowledge of the incumbent's
costs or motives.2 5 A new entrant can only partially understand
what inspires the market and consumers to operate as they do;
each business decision and market prediction, therefore, is charac-
terized by some uncertainty. While a challenger's imperfect infor-
mation generally is unrelated to an incumbent's efficiency, it can
create entry barriers or otherwise benefit an incumbent in a variety
of ways.
Professor Williamson, for example, suggests that prospective
lenders might perceive significant risks in loaning substantial sums
Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 994 (1979); and capacity expansion investment, see Spence, Entry, Capacity,
Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977). Professor Scherer sug-
gests that a firm's conglomerate structure sometimes serves as a foundation for predation. F.
SCHERER, supra note 18, at 335-40. In a personal communication economists Mark Fratrik
and Robert Stoner have suggested a broader catalogue of entry barriers and structural mar-
ket conditions that may be especially pertinent to predation: (1) product trans-shipment
costs; (2) the importance of experience and the ease with which it is acquired, i.e., the shape
of the industry experience curve; (3) the history of the industry and the dominant firm,
including the latter's reputation for predation and the frequency of previous successful
predatory efforts in the relevant market; (4) the nature of manufacturer/retailer relation-
ships in the industry; (5) the product's initial cost and its frequency of purchase; (6) the
importance of test marketing; (7) the degree to which the incumbent and entrant are mul-
tiproduct, multimarket firms; and (8) the industry's maturity. Letter from Mark Fratrik to
James Hurwitz and William Kovacic (November 12, 1981).
24. See R. BORK, supra note 13, at 314-20; R. PoSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 92-93 (1976); Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 173-74 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston
eds. 1974); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 267-76.
25. See, e.g., R. Zerbe, The Economic and Empirical Content of Alternative Predation
Rules (1980) (unpublished manuscript on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). Zerbe believes
that imperfect or incomplete information is necessary for all predation. Id. at 4.
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of money to a market entrant, especially one that faces a nontrivial
threat of predation.2 8 An entrant's chances of success are predict-
able only to a limited extent. Furthermore, the lender reasonably
might fear either that the entrant is failing because of incompe-
tence-not predation-or that, theory notwithstanding, the preda-
tory tactics will succeed nonetheless. The conservative lender, of
course, will charge according to the maximum extent of his per-
ceived risk. Thus, the uncertainty associated with entry at the very
least will increase the entrant's capital costs vis-&-vis the estab-
lished firm's costs for the same funds. To the extent that capital
markets do levy a risk premium under these circumstances, a
dominant firm could exploit this cost differential to deter even an
equally efficient challenger.2
Professors Posner, Williamson, and Scherer suggest another
form of predation that is based on imperfect information, and
which is different from the traditional deep-pocket concept. They
contend that a firm's reputation for predation, if credible, can de-
ter entry into markets besides those in which the actual predation
occurs.2 A victim of predation in one market can serve as a chill-
ing example to prospective entrants and challengers in all the
predator's markets. Moreover, reputation effects can extend to dif-
ferent geographic markets, different product markets, and later
time periods. If, for example, a firm is debating over which of two
markets to enter, and the dominant firm in one has a credible rep-
utation for preying upon market challengers, the prospective en-
trant might well decide to enter the other market. The entrant, of
course, would know that predatory battles are expensive-whether
in the marketplace or in courts-and that victory may provide re-
llef that is too little and too late. Thus, a single instance of preda-
tion may yield a double dividend: even if predation in one market
may not pay acceptable returns from that market alone, the effects
of a general reputation for toughness may provide ample benefits
across several markets.
2 9
26. Williamson, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 656-59 (1974).
27. Professor Posner finds that this argument is valid, although he questions its mag-
nitude. Posner, supra note 15, at 936 n.31, 945.
28. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 184-87; F. SCHERER, supra note 18, at 560; William-
son, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 1512, 1522 (1972).
29. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 184-87; Williamson, supra note 28, at 1512, 1522. See
also D. Kreps & R. Wilson, On the Chain-Store Paradox and Predation's Reputation for
Toughness (unpublished manuscript); R. Masson & D. Eisenstadt, A Stochastic Rationale
for Predatory Pricing (1975) (paper presented at 1975 Econometric Society Meeting).
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Masson and Reynolds have examined imperfect information as
the basis for "noisy pricing" predation, in which a firm disguises a
general pattern of predatory pricing by some inconsistent signals.30
They contend that this strategem may deceive a firm-or its po-
tential lenders-into believing that the entrant's failure was due to
nothing more than the market's normal, competitive rigors. Under
these circumstances, entrants will either exit or go bankrupt rather
than offer a defense, since they perceive no predation against
which to defend. Moreover, the appearance that the market could
not accommodate both the established firm and the failed chal-
lenger may also deter other potential entrants.
Imperfect information thus is essential to both reputation pre-
dation and noisy pricing predation; indeed, the two are opposite
sides of the same coin. With reputation predation, the established
firm wishes to disguise its secret unwillingness to prey upon every
actual and potential challenger by publicly emphasizing its aggres-
siveness toward rivals. In contrast, an established firm that is prac-
ticing noisy pricing predation seeks to conceal the fact of its preda-
tory conduct through signals which are designed to indicate that
only natural market forces are at work. As long as the challenger
does not know the dominant firm's true costs, profit details, moti-
vations, and intentions, it will have difficulty accurately assessing
what has happened-or will likely happen-and why. In sum, this
uncertainty may be a substantial advantage that the dominant
firm can exploit to increase the challenger's-and its shareholders'
and lenders'-perception of misjudged risks and opportunity. If
used effectively, this ploy may force a challenger to pay a higher
risk premium for market entry, to adopt a cautious rather than an
aggressive competitive stance, and perhaps to abandon effective
but costly strategic defenses. Thus, imperfect information can
serve as a potential entry barrier and a foundation for predation.31
30. R. Masson & R. Reynolds, Predation: The "Noisy" Pricing Strategy (Fall 1980)
(unpublished manuscript on file at Vanderbilt Law Review).
31. Salop, Introduction to STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 19-22 (S.
Salop ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST ANALYSIS]. Salop observes that while en-
trants may also engage in deception and other strategies based on imperfect information, on
balance the incumbent is generally in the superior position because it typically will be eco-
nomically less vulnerable and will have more detailed cost, profit, and other market
information.
Salop includes information among the inputs that a firm needs-for example, raw
materials, good personnel, and marketing outlets-to compete effectively. If a dominant
firm can raise the cost or reduce the quality or amount of a rival's inputs without equally
hurting itself, it may be engaging in what Salop terms "input predation." This situation
might occur, for example, when an incumbent deliberately interferes with a rival's test mar-
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This overview certainly is not intended to resolve the debate
concerning the existence, form, frequency, or dangers of predatory
activity. Nevertheless, these problems need to be introduced, since
attempts to solve them directly affect the selection of a standard
by which to measure the propriety of a firm's pricing, innovation,
and promotion decisions. Obviously, the relative strictness of a
suggested enforcement policy will vary in proportion to its propo-
nent's assessment of predation's incidence and dangers. Moreover,
whatever standard is chosen must be simple enough that business
managers and courts can both readily understand it and apply it.
In addition, the standard must not engender economically undesir-
able market distortions from the efforts of firms, courts, and the
government to follow-or circumvent-it. Finally, for reasons of
fairness and economic efficiency, the rule should not give rise to
excessive false positive errors, false negative errors, or litigation
costs.32
These considerations present demanding policy requirements
in any context. The task is even more difficult when, as here, seri-
ous disagreement exists about whether there is a problem worth
addressing at all, not to mention the debate over the problem's
magnitude and implications. Notwithstanding these difficulties,
the lower courts and scholars have expended substantial effort to
address the issues in this area. The Supreme Court, however, has
not squarely faced the predation question since 1967 in Utah Pie
Co. v. Continental Baking Co."3 While even a cursory examination
of the debate suggests that still more development is needed and
will be forthcoming, a comparison of the current state of learning
with the level of analysis that the Supreme Court offered fifteen
years ago in Utah Pie shows that these lower courts and commen-
tators have made major progress.
No fewer than nine standards or frameworks for addressing
ket efforts or seeks onerous labor regulations and contracts that will hurt its more labor-
intensive rivals disproportionately.
32. False positive errors are condemnations of activity that in fact enhances consumer
welfare; false negative errors are failures to condemn as predatory that activity which
reduces consumer welfare. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 218, 223. Each proposed
standard for addressing predation has either false positive or false negative errors-most
have both-and most proponents tend to criticize differing proposals for accepting the
wrong mix-or wrongly calculating the mix-of these errors. Theory alone, however, cannot
resolve the controversy over which proposal is the most appropriate. First, empirical inquir-
ies must be made into the frequency and nature of the harms that result from predation.
Second, the evaluator must establish a hierarchy of economic, social, and political values to
assess the gravity of these adverse effects and to weigh them against the others.
33. 386 U.S. 685 (1967); see notes 81-108 infra and accompanying text.
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predation have been proposed since 1975.3" In complexity these
proposals range from no standard at all-since according to these
proponents no problem exists 5-to a full-scale, rule of reason
analysis of all pertinent factors in each individual case." Between
these extremes, some proposals recommend adoption of short-
term" or long-term marginal costs8 as the threshold floor for law-
ful pricing. Others, in balancing the need for simplicity against the
need for a more sophisticated economic analysis, urge a prelimi-
nary evaluation of structural and other factors to determine at the
outset whether the market in question is conducive to profitable
predation." Some approaches examine the strategic qualities of
the predator's behavior to determine whether the conduct would
be profit-maximizing for the predator and would enhance con-
sumer welfare in general, even if it did not have obvious entry-
deterring or exit-inducing effects.' 0 Still other proposals, also fo-
34. For an excellent collection of much of the modern predation literature, see Preda-
tory Conduct and Empirical Studies in Collusion, 10 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 1
(1980). In addition, for two good critiques of this typically economically oriented predation
literature intended for lawyers, see Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pric-
ing Literature, in ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 155, and Brodley & Hay, Preda-
tory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 738 (1981). Finally, for a review from a different perspective, see McGee,
Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
35. See R. BORK, supra note 13, at 154; Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 336.
36. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1976). See generally notes 115-82 infra and accompanying text; see also
Schmalensee, supra note 23, at 1028-29.
37. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 6. See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW TT 710-722 (1978); Areeda, Predatory Pricing (1980), 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 897
(1980).
38. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 184-85.
39. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 244-49. Professors Joskow and
Klevorick propose a two-tier evaluation of predation. They first would analyze the relevant
market's structure to determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that monopoly
power has been or could be sustained by the use of price reductions." Id. at 244. According
to Joskow and Klevorick, these structural characteristics include (1) the dominant firm's
market share; (2) the size of other firms in the market; (3) the stability of market shares
over time; (4) the dominant firm's profit history; (5) the elasticity of demand for the incum-
bent's product; and (6) any preconditions for entry into the market. As their second tier
analysis, assuming that the industry seems reasonably conducive to predatory behavior,
these authors would assess the incumbent's behavior according to a set of cost- and strat-
egy-based rules that would, with exceptions, use average total cost as the threshold of
illegality.
40. Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predatory Product Innovation, in
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 301. Professors Ordover and Willig would proscribe
all activity-whether pricing, advertising, or some other form of conduct-that meets each
of.three conditions. First, the incumbent must have had available to it an alternative re-
sponse to entry that would have been less likely to induce the new rival to exit the market.
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cusing on strategic considerations, adopt a "business as usual" re-
quirement, either limiting the established firm to its trend-
adjusted output for the pre-entry period"' or permitting only price
decreases that will not be reversed for a substantial period.42
Among these suggested standards, the cost-based proposals clearly
have become the foundation for most judicial analyses and, there-
fore, deserve further elaboration here.
Professors Areeda and Turner initiated the recent round of
predatory pricing commenta'y with their proposal in 1975 that
prices at or above reasonably anticipated short-term marginal cost
should be deemed lawful, and that prices below reasonably antici-
pated short-term marginal cost should be deemed unlawful.4 s The
one exception Areeda and Turner allow is a case in which a firm's
price, while below marginal cost, remains above its average cost;
this situation, however, is likely to arise only when excess demand
induces a firm to expand output beyond the point at which average
costs are at their minimum. Because calculating the cost of produc-
ing the next additional unit of output-marginal cost-is exceed-
ingly difficult, Areeda and Turner suggest the use of average varia-
Second, when analyzed ex ante and assuming the victim's market exit, the incumbent's cho-
sen action must have offered greater long term profits than the less onerous alternative
would have provided. Last, assuming that the entrant remains in the market, the incum-
bent's chosen action, again analyzed ex ante, must have offered less long-term profits than
the alternative would have produced.
Although neither proposes a specific legal standard, both Spence and Salop regard the
irreversibility of an incumbent's actions as often crucial to credible, strategic entry deter-
rence. Spence, for example, posits that the timing and extent of capacity investment can
often be superior to price manipulations as an entry-deterring device. Whereas the largely
irreversible nature of capacity investment decisions makes them extremely credible evidence
of the incumbent's commitment to resist market challenges unrelentingly, rivals know that
prices can be changed repeatedly with relative ease. See Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence,
69 AM. EcON. REv. 335 (1979); Spence, supra note 23.
41. Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 21. Professor Williamson would require
a dominant firm facing new entry to refrain from expanding its output long enough to allow
the entrant to recover some of its initial costs and to achieve whatever efficiencies it can. Id.
at 296. He suggests that a 12- to 18-month restriction generally would be sufficient. Id.
Professor Williamson would supplement this standard with an average total cost rule when
the victims are established firms. Id. at 321-23, 336-37.
42. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Pred-
atory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979). Professor Baumol would allow a dominant firm to
lower its prices without limit in response to new entry, but he would not allow the firm to
withdraw any part of the reduction for a long period-perhaps for five years. Id. at 4, 8.
43. Areeda & Turner, supra note 6. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, M 710-
722. Professor McGee notes that in 1965 he proposed a marginal or average variable cost
test for predation cases brought under the Robinson-Patman Act. See McGee, supra note
34, at 290.
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ble cost 4 as a surrogate. Thus, they propose that prices at or above
reasonably anticipated average variable cost be presumed lawful,
and that prices below that level be conclusively presumed unlaw-
ful.45 Although Areeda and Turner would not permit a monopolist
a defense on the ground that its pricing was "promotional" or
designed to "meet competition," they would permit a nonmono-
polist to engage in temporary promotional pricing below marginal
cost to stimulate demand.
The Areeda/Turner formulation has deeply influenced the
courts and has provided either the analytical foundation or the
point of departure for most of their decisions.48 This approach
claims three important virtues. First, it places relatively few curbs
on an incumbent's responses to entry; the standard, therefore,
minimizes the risk of sheltering an inefficient firm. Areeda and
Turner intend this permissiveness; it rests on their conclusion that
predation is a "highly unlikely" phenomenon that does not war-
rant more sweeping measures.47 This approach also dovetails with
Areeda's and Turner's proposal of a cause of action that would
permit the government to seek the dissipation of substantial and
persistent monopoly power-however acquired-without also hav-
ing to demonstrate that the monopolist engaged in exclusionary or
anticompetitive behavior."' Second, the AreedalTurner standard
44. A firm's variable costs are those expenses whose amount depends greatly on the
firm's short-run rate of output. The costs of raw materials and wages of production employ-
ees are two major examples of variable costs. In contrast, fixed costs are expenses that re-
main relatively constant regardless of short-run changes in output. Fixed costs encompass
expenses such as wages for management employees, real estate taxes, and physical plant
costs. A firm's average variable cost is the sum of its variable costs divided by total output.
See R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 42-81 (2d ed. 1972).
45. The text states the formulation of the Areeda/Turner proposal as it appears in
their 1978 treatise; in their 1975 article they proposed that both presumptions be conclusive.
Compare Areeda & Turner, supra note 6, at 732-33 with 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 37, 711d. Areeda & Turner focus on "reasonably anticipated" average variable cost to
permit firms to seek expansion to more efficient output levels.
46. See, e.g., SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,316 (8th Cir.
1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
47. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, 711c.
48. Id. 614-623. The authors state,
In sum: (A) obtaining a monopoly should be lawful for all purposes to the extent the
monopoly is inevitable or based on superior skill; (B) the persistent monopoly should
be immune from equitable relief only to the extent that it is based on economies of
scale, indivisible resources, legal license other than patents, the patents that first cre-
ated it, or radically new patents that displace such patents.
Id. % 623a(6). Areeda and Turner also assert that neither the legislative history nor the
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purports to be simple enough for courts and business managers to
apply readily. Last, the standard offers consumers the possibility
of reaping substantial benefits from low, post-entry pricing.
Each of these purported virtues is subject to challenge.4 In-
deed, the process of scholarly debate has given rise to a rival aver-
age total cost"0 standard, which has received as much consideration
in more recent court decisions as the Areedaf/urner formulation.
Moreover, other proposals that courts have not applied directly
nonetheless have influenced the specific ways in which courts have
refined and modified the cost-based tests to make them better ac-
count for various legal, economic, factual, and administrative
considerations.
Professor Posner has proffered perhaps the most notable aver-
age total cost test.5 1 While Posner agrees that courts should con-
demn conduct which would violate the Areeda/Turner standard, he
takes the analysis a step further. In his view established firms do
not always need to price below average variable cost to prey suc-
cessfully. Less dramatic action often will suffice, especially during
an entrant's vulnerable start-up period.2 Accordingly, Posner
statutory language of section 2 of the Sherman Act precludes such a cause of action, which
they argue is "only a modest step beyond existing precedents." Id. I 623b. See also Round-
table on Predatory Practices, in ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 635.
49. Professor Joskow contends that judicial adoption of a simple per se rule was virtu-
ally inevitable, but he.observes that the AreedaTurner standard
has not been accorded generally favorable reviews by economists; the rave reviews
come from the courts. It does not represent the triumph of economic efficiency over
political considerations. . . . I attribute the adoption of this particular rule to the de-
sire of the judiciary to extract itself from the chaos of existing case law, not to their
"getting religion." I attribute the elegant footnotes to their law clerks.
Joskow, Comments on Pitofsky, in ANTITRUST FOR THE 1980's 201-02 (0. Williamson ed.
1980).
50. A firm's average total cost is calculated by dividing its total cost-the sum of its
fixed and variable expenses-by its total output. See R. DORFMAN, supra note 44, at 47-48.
See also note 44 supra.
51. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 184-96.
52. Posner believes that "predatory pricing cannot be dismissed as inevitably an irra-
tional practice." Id. at 186. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the challenger
must commit resources that it cannot move in and out of the market without incurring some
cost-in essence that the challenger faces exit and reentry barriers. Therefore, the dominant
firm may be able to practice predation and still price above average variable cost. Ordover
and Willig, on the other hand, observe that if either the costs of market exit are too high or
the costs of reentry are de minimis, and if both the incumbent and the challenger realize
these facts, then predation will be unlikely. Ordover & Willig, supra note 40, at 307. These
latter arguments, however, should be applied with care. While an incumbent may not be
able to force the challenger's permanent exit under the conditions that Ordover and Willig
describe, it nevertheless may prefer an inactive or restrained rival to a vigorous one. Preda-
tion that causes such a result also may deter additional entry by providing a warning signal
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would rebuttably presume that pricing is predatory if it is less than
long-term marginal cost and is coupled with the intent to exclude
an equally or more efficient competitor." The logical basis for this
standard is that predation has inherently long-term attributes-a
sacrifice of short-term profits to reap greater rewards in the long
term-and, therefore, any standard should have a long-term em-
phasis. The test's economic rationale is that a firm which fails to
cover both its variable and fixed costs will not be a viable, efficient
competitor over the long run. Like Areeda and Turner, Posner ac-
cepts average variable cost as an acceptable surrogate for marginal
cost, but in his proposal, of course, the crucial measure is average
total cost.
Other commentators also endorse using an average total cost
standard in predation analysis. Although Professor Williamson
would impose an output restriction for a limited term on dominant
firms that face new entry, he would use an average total cost stan-
dard for evaluating responses to challenges from established ri-
vals.5 4 Similarly, once a court initially determined that the market
structure itself was conducive to profitable predation, Professors
Joskow and Klevorick would apply an average total cost analysis to
assess an incumbent's response to entry.55
As new opinions continue to emerge in the attempt to formu-
late a coherent predation analysis, one recurring controversy cen-
ters on the issue of the relative merits of average variable and av-
erage total cost standards.56 Average total cost tests limit the
to other firms contemplating entry. Moreover, the dominant firm may have intended only
that its aggressive conduct serve as a market discipline, that is, as a threat or notice that the
rival must cooperate in industry-wide pricing above competitive levels.
53. Posner defines predation as "pricing at a level calculated to exclude from the mar-
ket an equally or more efficient competitor." R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 188. Similarly,
the majority and a concurring opinion in what is popularly known as the ReaLemon decision
urged a variation of Posner's average total cost rule. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 823-
32 (1978) (Pitofsky, Commissioner, concurring), appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan.
10, 1979). See also Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Prac-
tices, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 233, 235 (1979). In another concurring opinion to ReaLemon,
however, Commissioner Clanton stated that he preferred an average variable cost test. 92
F.T.C. at 813-16 (Clanton, Commissioner, concurring).
54. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 1527-30.
55. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 249-55.
56. It is important to caution that loosely aggregating the various proposals into aver-
age variable cost and average total costs "camps," while useful for some purposes, risks
obscuring the theoretical complexities and limitations embodied in each commentator's for-
mulation. Presumptions, preconditions, and exceptions significantly differentiate the various
academic proposals, just as the underlying facts of litigated cases serve to differentiate judi-
cial formulations. For example, although the proposals by Posner, Williamson, and Joskow
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incumbent somewhat more than average variable cost standards
because these tests tend to impose greater restrictions on the in-
cumbent's range of pricing discretion. Whether the extra limitation
aids efficiency by curbing otherwise unaddressed instances of pre-
dation, or whether it harms efficiency by sheltering inefficient firms
that could not otherwise compete, remains a matter of some con-
troversy. From an economic perspective, to set a price that covers
only average variable costs is abnormal long-term behavior. None-
theless, in a post-entry price war consumers benefit more under
the average variable cost standard-at least initially-because of
the possibility that prices will drop to a level which is even lower
than average total cost. On the other hand, consumers may obtain
more overall benefit under the average total cost standard if an
entrant's survival contributes to the maintenance of a more com-
petitive market over the long term.
The two basic cost standards also can be compared from the
standpoint of their administrative merits. Under the average varia-
ble cost standard, it is more difficult to allocate costs to the proper
time period, for example, than under the average total cost rule.57
This administrative burden is especially acute because some
costs-for example, advertising-have both short- and long-term
attributes.58 Other allocation problems, however, are common to
and Klevorick all assert that average total cost is the appropriate cost standard, these com-
mentators disagree over what circumstances warrant the standard's application.
57. In defending the administrative merits of their proposal, Areeda and Turner state
that
[t]here are no doubt disputable questions as to (i) which costs should be included in
variable costs, (ii) proper accounting valuation of inventories, and (iii) allocations of
costs in multi-product enterprises. The first can be resolved by more or less arbitrary
decisions. The second has no apparent relevance to variable costs of current produc-
tion. The third should not be difficult where the firm has had consistent accounting
treatment of cost allocations over a substantial period of time.
Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1346 (1978) (foot-
notes omitted).
58. Allocation of promotional expenses is a key issue in computing cost. While Areeda
and Turner recognized in their original article that advertising may be increased in a preda-
tory response to entry, the authors acknowledged that they were "not wholly satisfied" with
their solution, which included only extraordinary promotional expenses as part of average
variable cost. Areeda & Turner, supra note 6, at 729. More recently, the authors' treatise
appears to take the additional step of accepting all promotional expenses-not just ex-
traordinary ones-as part of average variable cost. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37,
at 721. Some empirical basis exists for this position. Professor Scherer, for example, has
suggested that the effects of advertising generally decay fairly rapidly. F. SCHERER, supra
note 18, at 286 (citing Clarke, Econometric Measurement of the Duration of Advertising
Effect on Sales, 13 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 345 (1976)). With this shift in position, Areeda
and Turner have brought their average variable cost formulation closer to the average total
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both tests. For example, firms likely will allocate costs to various
geographic regions without concern for how a court subsequently
may define a relevant geographic market. Similarly, it is difficult to
calculate relevant prices and costs in situations in which products
and product models are numerous or change frequently, or when
marketing and production costs are not confined to the products
that are relevant for a given case. Moreover, relative prices some-.
times are difficult to ascertain because of variations in product
models. The complexity of sophisticated promotional cam-
paigns-including consumer coupons, dealer coupons, discounts,
and contests-that cover a broad array of products and regions can
be still another source of difficulty. Surprisingly, however, these
technical problems apparently have not caused courts to hesitate
in adopting the cost-based standards.5 9
The administrative question, however, is not entirely one of
technical measurement and ease of enforcement. If the issue is
viewed as an assessment of what factors the courts should examine
in evaluating a claim of predation, administrability becomes funda-
mentally a substantive concern. The cost-based tests have been
challenged on this ground from two directions. On the one hand,
Professor Bork argues that predation rarely, if ever, occurs, and
that the costs of trying to identify, litigate, and remedy the few
possible episodes far exceed the benefits of such an effort. In
Bork's view, therefore, even a strict cost-based test considers too
many factors and is an administrative waste.60 Professor Scherer,
on the other hand, believes that cost-based tests are too simplistic.
He argues that predation must be evaluated and understood in its
entire market context, even if this evaluation is a complex task.
According to Scherer, anything short of such an inquiry would be
self-deceiving and would lead to economically perverse results.
Thus, Scherer would have courts evaluate, among other factors,
the relative cost positions of the monopolist and fringe firms, the scale of
entry required to secure minimum costs, whether fringe firms are driven out
entirely or merely suppressed, whether the monopolist expands its output to
replace the output of excluded rivals or restricts supply again when the rivals
withdraw, and whether any long-run compensatory expansion by the monop-
cost rules that others have devised. Significant differences between the approaches remain,
however, especially in industries with either large, long-term research and development pro-
grams or rapid depreciation of large capital investment.
59. Of course, the courts may be choosing deliberately not to recognize or discuss these
complexities. See, e.g., notes 159-63 infra and accompanying text.
60. R. BORK, supra note 13, at 154.
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olist entails investment in scale economy-embodying new plant.
1
While Scherer's approach as a whole may be unwieldy, 2 the host
of structural, strategic, and other factors that he contends are per-
tinent have not escaped the attention of even those courts that os-
tensibly apply simpler cost-based rules.63
Without question, these academic proposals have had an enor-
mous impact on the law of predation. 4 The proponents of these
theories, however, are neither judges nor lawmakers, and the courts
in which the actual cases are decided must focus on more than eco-
nomic theory. However sound a potential outcome is from the
standpoint of economics, it must also reflect the existing statutes
and judicial precedents. Accordingly, before the Article discusses
the effect of the scholarly debate on recent judicial decisions, the
following two sections review the statutory and common-law envi-
ronment in which those decisions were made. Section B briefly de-
scribes the federal statutes that are the most pertinent to the pre-
dation issue, statutes whose broad language has afforded courts
substantial latitude to consider, incorporate, and further develop
the commentators' suggestions. Older case law similarly imposes
few constraints on the judiciary because recent court cases, with
their newer economic view but divergent results, virtually have su-
perseded the older ones. Section C, therefore, discusses only Utah
Pie, which retains lingering significance as the most recent Su-
preme Court case on predation, even though it contrasts sharply
with some of the post-1975 decisions.
B. The Statutory Authority"5
Federal antitrust law seeks to control predation principally
61. Scherer, supra note 36, at 890 (footnote omitted).
62. See Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891, 897
(1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 21, at 288 n.16.
63. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079). Janich Bros., Inc. v. American
Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 854 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
64. See, e.g., Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977). The Hanson decision almost totally accepts Areeda's and Turner's pro-
posed standard and supporting analysis.
65. Consistent with this Article's focus on federal cases, this section discusses only
federal antitrust statutes. While the Article concentrates on federal authority, we should
note that twenty-five states now have competition statutes that prohibit sales below cost:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1462 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-106, -303 (1979); CAL. Bus.
AND PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-105 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 481-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-402 to -404 (1977); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 365.030-.050 (1970);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:422 (West 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1204-A (1964);
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through the application of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 6 which prohibits both monopolization and attempts to mo-
nopolize. As articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Grinnell Corp.,e7 the monopolization offense requires the existence
of monopoly power plus some conduct indicating "the willful ac-
quisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident. '68 A finding of an attempt to
monopolize under section 2 traditionally has required proof of the
following elements: (1) A specific intent to control prices or destroy
competition; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to-
ward that end; and (3) a dangerous probability of success.69 To re-
cover damages for either monopolization or an attempt to monopo-
lize, the plaintiff must show not only that it suffered measurable
harm from the defendant's anticompetitive conduct, but also that
the injury was of a type that the antitrust laws were designed to
prevent.0
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14F (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.08 (West 1981);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 30-14-208 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-03 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-.11 (West 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211-217 (Purdon 1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13-1 to -8 (1969); S.C. CODE § 39-3-150 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-109
(1976); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 15.33 (Vernon 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-
7 to -12 (1953); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-1 to -10 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.040 (1978);
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-2 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.30 (West 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 40-4-
107 (1977). In most-if not all-cases these statutes also prohibit price discrimination.
Other states have enacted such statutes, but courts have held them unconstitutional because
of procedural infirmities. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-8 (West 1964). Still other states
have statutes that prohibit below cost pricing for particular products. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19-242 (West 1958) (drugs); IOWA CODE ANN. § 551A.3 (West 1946) (cigarettes);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-23-7 (1972) (cigarettes), -31-307 (1972) (milk products); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 59-1501 to -1518 (1978) (cigarettes).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
67. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
68. Id. at 570-71. Some authorities have suggested that the statutory history, language,
or purposes of § 2 do not clearly require the conduct element. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 37, 623a. See also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 298
n.57 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.
Supp. 983, 999 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 102 S.
Ct. 85 (1981); NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 151-63 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
NCRALP REPORT].
69. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See also NCRALP REPORT,
supra note 68, at 144-49.
70. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Speaking for a
unanimous Court, Justice Marshall stated that
[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or
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The definition of each element of the section 2 offenses is still
a matter of some controversy. These individual disagreements are
particularly important because the definition that a court adopts
for the specific intent and dangerous probability of success ele-
ments in an attempt to monopolize case, for example, has a direct
bearing on how that court will define and interpret the anticompe-
titive conduct element. An additional factor potentially influencing
a court's toleration or legal condemnation of allegedly predatory
conduct may stem from the courts' apparent tendency to define
the requisite elements of liability and damages more stringently
when a successful private plaintiff has the opportunity to recover
treble damages.7'
Another statutory basis for a claim of predation is section 2(a)
of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Antidis-
crimination Act.7 2 This provision prohibits direct or indirect dis-
crimination "in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. 73 In theory the Robinson-Pat-
man Act could complement the Sherman Act nicely; whereas the
Sherman Act has a relatively open-ended proscription of exclusion-
ary conduct but requires specific proof of the predator's actual or
probable acquisition of monopoly power, the converse is true of the
Robinson-Patman Act. In practice, however, courts have not "been
sympathetic to the claim that this law ought to function as part of
a cohesive policy about cotnpetition. ' '74 The Robinson-Patman Act
is far more detailed than most United States antitrust statutes and
thus has received a correspondingly technical and formalistic con-
struction.75 The economic analysis that courts have employed in
of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
Id. at 489. For a recent application of this standard, see Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 309 infra. See also SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), af'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 102 S. Ct. 85 (1981).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
73. Id.
74. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 680-81.
75. These detailed requirements include the following provisions: That the alleged dis-
crimination be revealed in the context of completed sales, as opposed to other types of
transactions; that the sales be to different customers and at different prices; that the goods
be tangible personal property; that the sales be either contemporaneous or made under com-
parable market conditions; and that the goods be of like kind and grade. 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976). The statute also provides for some exceptions. The first arises in situations in which
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applications of this statute, therefore, typically has been too shal-
low to distinguish effectively between economically desirable and
undesirable instances of price discrimination.
The third major statute that embraces predation claims is sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which authorizes the
Federal Trade Commission (Commission or FTC) to challenge
"unfair methods of competition. '7 6 The courts have interpreted
this authority to permit the FTC to redress not only violations of
the letter of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, but also incipient
violations and violations of the spirit of those Acts. 77 Despite its
greater substantive breadth-or perhaps because of it-section 5 is
available only for public enforcement. 8 Of course, private plain-
tiffs may introduce proven section 5 violations as evidence in their
private suits alleging violations of the Sherman Act and Clayton
Act. 9 Without more, however, this proof would establish a basis
for treble damage awards only if the section 5 violations also con-
stituted violations of the letter of either the Sherman or Clayton
Acts themselves."0
C. The Legacy of Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.8 1
As noted previously, cost-based tests have prevailed in the
courts, although the debate continues over what specific cost stan-
dard the courts should apply and what additional tempering fac-
the discrimination results from cost differences that occurred because the buyers purchased
in different quantities. Id. § 13(a). The second arises when the seller offers a low price in one
locale in a good faith effort to meet competition. Id. § 13(b). For a good overview of these
technical requirements, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 676-706; ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 4, I THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT: POLICY AND LAW (1980). In Sullivan's
opinion the Robinson-Patman Act would be a far more "useful adjunct" to antitrust law if
the courts would undertake a more complete analysis of structural, conduct, and perform-
ance factors. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 688-89 (citing F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 160-63 (1962)). Curiously, the Supreme Court cited Rowe
in Utah Pie for an analogous point, but did not undertake such an analysis in that case.
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12 (1967); see notes 81-108
infra and accompanying text.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
77. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe
Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966); see Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competi-
tion" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REV. 227 (1980).
78. Although the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), does not explicitly foreclose private
enforcement, the courts have held that the Commission alone may enforce this provision.
See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. See, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 76 (1st
Cir. 1969).
80. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12(a), 16(a) (1976).
81. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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tors, if any, they should weigh in the balance.2 This controversy,
however, is a lower-court phenomenon; the Supreme Court has yet
to consider directly the theoretical and economic arguments and
the host of academic proposals that have appeared since 1975.
The Court decided Utah Pie in 1967. The case presented
many of the important issues that currently are being debated, but
the opinion is more impressive for its exalted source than for the
quality of its analysis. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's expres-
sions retain some precedential value and cannot be overlooked as a
potential indication of how the Court might again address preda-
tion questions should it accept for review one or more of the cases
currently proceeding through the lower courts-cases that present
conflicting standards among the various district and circuit
courts."' The Utah Pie decision is also important because the lower
courts have not ignored it in their analyses of predation issues."
Utah Pie Company was a relatively small, family-controlled
pie bakery in the Salt Lake City area. In 1957 the company ex-
panded into the frozen pie market, which placed it in direct com-
petition with the three respondents-Continental Baking, Pet
Milk, and Carnation-who already were distributing frozen pies in
the region. Because Utah Pie's product was immediately successful
and the market was expanding rapidly-market volume more than
quadrupled between 1958 and 1961-the company built a new
plant in Salt Lake City in 1958. This addition gave Utah Pie a cost
advantage over its competitors because the latter did not have any
local plants. With its new facility, Utah Pie quickly achieved mar-
ket leadership in the Salt Lake City area and relinquished it only
briefly during the complaint period. Each respondent, however,
was a large national company that dominated the frozen pie mar-
ket in one or more other regions of the country. Thus, despite
Utah Pie's volume and overall market share leadership in the local
area, it was hardly a financial power that instilled fear into the
hearts of the respondents.8 5
82. See notes 34-63 supra and accompanying text.
83. Compare Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079) with Chillicothe Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
84. See, e.g., Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT-Grinnell Corp., 1980-1 Trade
Cas. T 63,862 (D. Mass. 1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 472 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1981) (No. 81-1116). See also note 92 infra.
85. Utah Pie's volume expanded from nearly 40,000 dozen in 1958 to over 102,000
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During at least some of the relevant complaint period, which
encompassed all of 1958 through August of 1961, each respondent
charged less for its frozen pies in the Salt Lake City area than it
did elsewhere-even taking into account cost differences such as
trans-shipment expenses. Continental Baking's prices were not
only geographically discriminatory, but also below its "direct cost
plus an allocation for overhead" in the local market." Pet Milk
apparently also incurred larger losses on its operations in the Salt
Lake City market than in other markets. Indeed, Pet acknowl-
edged that at one time it had placed an industrial spy in Utah
Pie's plant.
8 7
The jury in Utah Pie failed to find a conspiracy or other Sher-
man Act violation, but it did find Robinson-Patman Act viola-
tions."8 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, how-
ever, and held that Pet's prices for private label pies were justified
because of the difference between Pet's costs in the Salt Lake City
area and its costs in other markets.8 9 The court also ruled that in-
sufficient evidence existed from which the jury reasonably could
have concluded that the other alleged geographic price discrimina-
tions by all three respondents had caused the requisite deleterious
effect on competition."e The Supreme Court, with Justice White
speaking for the majority, reversed the court of appeals and re-
manded the case for further consideration.91
The Court's opinion in Utah Pie may be interpreted narrowly
as merely a sufficiency of the evidence case. Indeed, this interpre-
tation may be one of the reasons why recent predation decisions
generally have declined to rely heavily upon the case.92 A more
dozen in 1961. Its sales volume steadily increased from $353,000 in 1958, to $430,000 in
1959, to $504,000 in 1960, and to $589,000 in 1961. During these same years, however, Utah
Pie's market share was less consistent-66.5% in 1958, 34.3% in 1959, 45.5% in 1960, and
45.3% in 1961. The market's rapid expansion may explain some of this erratic performance.
In 1959, however, Pet was the market share leader with 35.5% of the market-.2% more
than Utah Pie. In the following year Pet lost over five share points, and Utah Pie gained
more than eleven; Utah Pie's net income was also erratic, showing $7,090, $11,897, $7,636,
and $9,216 in the four successive years of the complaint period. 386 U.S. at 689-91, 691-92
n.7.
86. Id. at 698.
87. Id. at 697.
88. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 349 F.2d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd,
386 U.S. 685 (1967).
89. Id. at 148, 150.
90. Id. at 152, 153.
91. 386 U.S. at 704.
92. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). The Fifth Circuit in American Excelsior distin-
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convincing explanation for this benign neglect, however, is that,
from the perspective of current economic theory, the Court's anal-
ysis in Utah Pie is somewhat superficial and outmoded. The opin-
ion, therefore, is difficult to interpret meaningfully and apply. Not-
withstanding these deficiencies, the Court's treatment of three
issues in Utah Pie deserves some discussion here.
First, in recounting the evidence of Continental Baking's pred-
atory conduct against Utah Pie Company, the Supreme Court ob-
served not only that Continental's price was geographically dis-
criminatory, but also that it was "less than its direct cost plus an
allocation for overhead."93 While this language arguably invites an
interpretation that the Court was applying an average total cost
standard, the Court did not indicate how this formula would be
computed in practice. In particular, the Court failed to specify the
amounts and types of overhead costs that would be allocated. It
did not state, for example, whether promotional costs or the oppor-
tunity costs of capital would be included in the calculation. The
answers to these questions cannot be discerned from the opinion
because the Court provided no theoretical or other basis for its
standard.9 4 The Court also failed to articulate the standard's legal
significance; that is, whether pricing above "direct cost plus an al-
location for overhead" satisfies a bright-line test for lawful pricing,
invokes a rebuttable presumption of legality, or merely provides
one evidentiary signal that the pricing level is not unlawful.95 Not-
withstanding this lack of specificity, however, Utah Pie reasonably
may be interpreted as mildly supportive of an average total cost, as
opposed to average variable cost, standard.
Second, some commentators assert that "intent does not serve
any useful role in arguments about predation." 96 The essence of
guished Utah Pie on the ground that the Supreme Court in Utah Pie had been concerned
with the quantum of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case, while the circuit court
found itself concerned with the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a motion for a di-
rected verdict. Id. at 724 n.30. Similarly, in 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116), the circuit
court read Utah Pie as limited only to geographic-as opposed to selective-price discrimi-
nation when evidence revealed both predatory intent and harm to competition. See also
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.
1981).
93. 386 U.S. at 698.
94. At all other relevant points in the opinion, the Court referred merely to "below-
cost pricing," without defining its concept of cost. Id. at 696 n.12, 701, 702, 702-03 n.14.
95. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d
917, 945 n.50 (9th Cir. 1981).
96. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 280-81.
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this position is that if certain business conduct is not economically
harmful, it should be of no legal concern, regardless of the alleged
wrongdoer's underlying intent. Other commentators, however, hold
a different view. Professor Posner, for example, includes an intent
element in his definition of predation, which focuses on the intent
to exclude an equally or more efficient competitor.9 7 Similarly, Pro-
fessor Sullivan asserts that "antitrust laws need not disregard the
pernicious." 98
The Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie clearly supports
the view that intent is relevant to a claim of predation. The Court
stated that
Chief Justice Hughes noted in a related antitrust context that the
"knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and pre-
diction of consequences." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 372, and we do not think it unreasonable for courts to follow that lead.
Although the evidence in this regard against Pet seems obvious, a jury would
be free to ascertain a seller's intent from surrounding economic circum-
stances, which would include persistent unprofitable sales below cost and
drastic price cuts themselves discriminatory. 9
Applying this notion, the Court determined that "persistent sales
below cost and radical price cuts themselves discriminatory" can-
not be ascribed merely to "fierce competitive instincts." 100
The Supreme Court's view in Utah Pie on the issue of intent
represents the mainstream position of both the traditional and the
more recent predation cases.10 1 As Professor Bork described this
conventional view: "Antitrust law has never clearly defined what it
means by predation, but the concept clearly contains an element of
wrongful or specific intent, of a deliberate seeking of market power
through means that would not be employed in the normal course
of competition. '" 10 2
While concentrating solely on effect may be attractive either
97. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 188. Easterbrook observes that Posner's concept of
intent is a limited one which is designed to narrow a cost-based rule that would otherwise
sweep within its purview many instances of desirable competitive conduct. Easterbrook also
notes that Posner has criticized the overuse of intent evidence in other contexts. Easter-
brook, supra note 18, at 280-81 (citing R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 41-77, 189-91).
98. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 111. See also NCRALP REPORT, supra note 68, at
150.
99. 386 U.S. at 696-97 n.12 (citing F. RowE, supra note 75, at 141-50).
100. Id. at 702-03 n.14.
101. See, e.g., 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116); William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981); SuperTurf v. Monsanto
Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,316 (8th Cir. 1981).
102. R. BORK, supra note 13, at 144.
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in theory or to those who urge that antitrust enforcement be used
exclusively for remediation, assessing that effect in practice is
hardly a mechanical process. To the extent that sales below cost
are accepted as inevitably leading to the undesirable effect, it is
nonetheless true that applying either of the cost-based tests is no
easier for a business to perform ex ante than for a court to perform
ex post. The available data is too frequently incomplete, unrelia-
ble, or ambiguous, and a business would have as much difficulty
avoiding transgressions as a court would have in redressing
them.103 It seems fair to assume, however, as an aid to analysis,
that conduct is most likely to have anticompetitive effects when it
is intended from the outset to be predatory. Because sales below
cost typically lack a rational business justification, they must stem
either from accident or from predatory intent. Accordingly, inde-
pendent evidence of intent continues to be an important interpre-
tive factor that, along with evidence of means and competitive ef-
fects, is weighed to determine whether or not a particular course of
conduct is "unreasonably exclusionary.
10 4
Last, Utah Pie is probably most vulnerable to criticism for its
evaluation of competitive harm. The major effect of the predation
and price discriminations that the Court found was a general de-
cline in the market's price structure. Up to a point, however, lower
prices typically benefit consumers and indicate vigorous competi-
tion. 1 05 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Utah Pie looked less
to the potential benefit to consumer welfare and more to Utah Pie
Company's inability to generate the funds it otherwise could have
obtained had prices been higher. While some below cost pricing
existed, the Court neither limited its concern over the deteriorat-
103. Determining the appropriate price and cost figures, for example, requires many
judgment calls about the method of allocating costs among purportedly relevant geographic
markets, product markets, and time periods.
104. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, echoed the Utah Pie
approach by stating that "[w]here a course of action is ambiguous, 'consideration of intent
may play an important role in divining the actual . . . conduct."' Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1981). See
also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th
Cir. 1981).
105. As discussed earlier, see notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text, a firm usually
will not find it profitable to price below cost unless the situation is one in which either deep-
pocket predation will be effective because strategic or structural factors such as high entry
barriers are present. Thus, the assumption that the firms which charge low prices are effi-




ing price structure to below-cost pricing nor indicated that this
type of pricing had any greater significance than the other conduct
at issue. Furthermore, the record gave no indication that the re-
spondents would have been able to achieve and exploit monopoly
power in the unlikely event of Utah Pie's demise.1 06 The Supreme
Court nonetheless held,
[W]e disagree with [the court of appeals'] apparent view that there is no rea-
sonably possible injury to competition as long as the volume of sales in a
particular market is expanding and at least some of the competitors in the
market continue to operate at a profit. Nor do we think that the [Robinson-
Patman] Act only comes into play to regulate the conduct of price discrimi-
nators when their discriminatory prices consistently undercut other competi-
tors. . . .We believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that erodes
competition as much as it does price discrimination that is intended to have
immediate destructive impact. In this case, the evidence shows a drastically
declining price structure which the jury could rationally attribute to contin-
ued or sporadic price discrimination.
10 7
The Supreme Court's evaluation in Utah Pie of below cost
pricing was cursory at best, and its assessment of price discrimina-
tion failed to consider whether the discrimination at issue was de-
sirable or undesirable from the perspective of maintaining a vigor-
ously competitive market. For all its faults, however, Utah Pie is
still a precedent that could be resurrected or interpreted anew at
any time. The Court's holding that a firm does not have to be fail-
ing or unprofitable to be a victim of predation, for example, may
have bearing on future cases that seek either to address strategic
forms of predation or to secure a remedy before the competitive
situation becomes irretrievable. Nonetheless, this potentially useful
holding appears to have been an accident of shallow reasoning, and
its import for future cases, therefore, is questionable. 1.°8
III. STANDARDS AND TRENDS
While enjoying great latitude, the lower courts have not been
entirely free from either statutory or precedential constraints in
106. The Supreme Court's failure to address these considerations in Utah Pie has ex-
posed the decision to harsh criticism. See, e.g., Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Su-
preme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967). For a discussion of the relevance
and importance of these considerations to the existence of predation, see notes 136-42 infra
and accompanying text.
107. 386 U.S. at 702-03.
108. Thus, the Third Circuit in Hommel, for example, emphasized that plaintiffs had
enjoyed a stable market share during the complaint period to bolster its finding that defen-
dants had caused no competitive harm. 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116).
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their attempts to decide predation cases. Within the contours of
the antitrust statutes and the traditional interpretations of preda-
tory conduct, the courts have been struggling to grasp and incorpo-
rate the myriad new proposals for analyzing predation. Some
trends and rough standards now seem to be emerging from their
efforts. This part of the Article attempts to identify these stan-
dards and trends and examine them in some detail. The part fo-
cuses on the three categories of activity that the commentators and
courts have regarded as the most significant subjects for predation
analysis: Pricing, innovation, and promotion.109 Despite the recur-
ring themes and common economic and policy issues, the trends in
each area largely have developed independently and are based on
factual and theoretical considerations unique to the particular type
of activity.110 This part, therefore, separately addresses each of the
three areas to provide an accessible guide to the practitioner who is
attempting to reconcile factual, theoretical, and economic concerns
about predation with the apparent diversity of judicial precedents.
The recent cases that have been selected 1 to illustrate these
trends address the substantive standards 2 for evaluating a defen-
109. Other types of assertedly predatory conduct include the following: (1) exclusive
dealing arrangements, see, e.g., Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
T 63,420 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,249 (3d Cir. 1981); (2) refusals to
deal, see, e.g., Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.
1980); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Grow-
ers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v.
CBS Inc., 459 F. Supp. 832 (C.D. Cal. 1978); (3) shifting from a system of dual- to self-
distribution, see, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d
Cir. 1975); (4) tying arrangements and full line forcing, see, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); Sargent-Welch Scien-
tific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); (5)
vertical price squeezes, see, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d
976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); and (6)
vexatious litigation, see, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
63,444 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
110.. The categories also are distinguishable according to the volume and sophistica-
tion of legal and economic literature that has appeared to treat the particular type of con-
duct. Pricing conduct, for example, has received careful, thorough scholarly scrutiny, but the
theoretical analysis of predatory innovation is comparatively rudimentary. See note 207 in-
fra and accompanying text.
111. For an explanation of the selection criteria, see note 294 infra. A list of the 57
cases that have been chosen is contained in Appendix A.
112. A good number of published opinions have dealt with issues unrelated to sub-
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dant's pricing, innovation, or promotion conduct within the con-
text of federal antitrust law.113
A. Pricing
Pricing cases account for the single largest group of reported
opinions that have dealt with antitrust predation claims since
1975.114 Collectively, the pricing decisions are perhaps most inter-
esting because they contain the greatest diversity of judicial views,
reflect the most sophisticated economic analysis, and are suffi-
ciently numerous to permit an identification of significant trends
over time. This section first discusses generally the effects of the
academic debate that was reviewed in part II upon post-1975 judi-
cial treatments of predatory pricing claims. It then examines the
evolution of legal standards governing pricing behavior, giving par-
ticular attention to the factors that judges have used to evaluate
pricing practices whose long-term consumer welfare effects are
subject to dispute. Finally, this section provides a suggested frame-
work for analyzing future judicial clarifications of existing stan-
dards and emphasizes cases on which the circuit courts or the Su-
preme Court are likely to rely in addressing future predation
claims.
1. General Trends in the Interplay of Economic Analysis and
Judicial Decisionmaking
One of the most striking features of antitrust case law since
1975 is the judiciary's increased reliance on economic analysis to
assess the legality of business pricing behavior. The economic com-
mentary reviewed in part II for the most part has displaced earlier
stantive standards for judging predatory conduct. See, e.g., Heille v. City of St. Paul, 1981-1
Trade Cas. 63,997 (D. Minn. 1981) (interstate commerce requirement); Bangor Punta
Corp. v. Marine Distribs., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. 64,006 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (standing);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (pred-
atory pricing issues were not reached because the case was decided on other substantive
grounds); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (effect of
state and federal regulatory schemes upon court's jurisdiction to treat antitrust claims).
113. For a list of the state statutes that prohibit anticompetitive conduct, see note 65
supra. In addition, some of this activity, particularly in the area of promotion, may be chal-
lenged on unfair competition or trade regulation grounds under statutes other than the anti-
trust laws. See, e.g., National Ass'n Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (Federal Communications Act); National Distrib. Co.
v. U.S. Treasury Dep't, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 626 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (Federal Alcohol Administration Act).




case law as the foundation for the courts' recent evaluations of va-
rious pricing practices.115 The vast majority of reported opinions in
the past six years-with virtually no exceptions-has attempted to
analyze challenged pricing strategies and their legal consequences
in fundamentally economic terms."' Although the exact bounda-
ries of existing pricing doctrine remain ill-defined, a litigant who
fails to address the current and developing economic thought in
the field unquestionably runs a substantial risk of defeat.
117
While microeconomic theory is now a standard tool of judicial
pricing analysis, the courts' abrupt transformation of contempo-
rary economic scholarship into legal doctrine has not been friction-
less. Two major pitfalls have accompanied this rapid absorption
process, which has recast a major field of antitrust law. First, as
the discussion in part II demonstrates, the recent economic litera-
ture is an intricate, often technically complex, body of material. As
a consequence, some courts have found it difficult to master the
concepts underlying the proposed liability theories and sometimes
have applied them erroneously. Although commentators in princi-
ple have approved of the courts' efforts at more sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis, they have pointed to several instances in which a
115. Although the principal figures in the academic debate disagree on the merits of
the different economic tests that have guided the courts' analyses, they look favorably upon
the increasingly economic orientation of judicial thought in this area. See Areeda, supra
note 37, at 909; Roundtable on Predatory Practices, supra note 48, at 625.
116. One common example of the courts' greater sensitivity to economic theory in re-
cent pricing opinions is their adoption of the prevailing economists' definition of the general
dynamic of predation as a trade-off of short-term revenues for long-term monopoly profits.
See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text. The District Court for the District of Colum-
bia underscored this point in a recent opinion that dealt with the government's challenge to
certain pricing practices of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company:
[A]lthough economists disagree on the frequency with which the phenomenon of preda-
tory pricing occurs, the conditions under which it is likely to exist, and the indicia by
which it may be detected, there is consensus that the term refers to "the deliberate
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the market and
then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of competition."
United States v. AT&T Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,277, at 74,245 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, 711b, at 151 (1978)). See also William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917, 931-32, 932 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. This fact is particularly evident in the rigor with which trial judges have dis-
missed-with the affirmance of appellate courts-the pricing allegations of plaintiffs who
either introduced no data that revealed the defendant's cost/price relationships or whose
complaints transparently rested on little more than dissatisfaction with the defendant's
ability to price below the plaintiff's own costs. See, e.g., Americana Indus. Inc. v. Wometco
de Puerto Rico, Inc., 556 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1977); Flair Zipper Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 1980-2
Trade Cas. 63,555 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384
(D. Del. 1978); General Communications Eng'r, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Elecs.,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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misapprehension of economic theory significantly affected a court's
application of an economically based rule."8
A second-and more serious-problem, however, stems from
the courts' attempts to give a decisive legal effect to ideas that are
still maturing and that have failed to command a consensus even
among economists. The swift evolution of predation literature
since 1975 has made it difficult for courts to rely confidently on
any single, proposed liability theory, since subsequent scholarship
may well undercut or substantially refine important elements of
that theory. This difficulty was evident in some of the early judi-
cial efforts to apply the Areeda/Turner marginal cost test.1 9 As
Professors Brodley and Hay have noted, the Areeda/Turner propo-
sal initially seemed to some courts to offer an effective, compara-
tively simple solution to a problem that until that time had been a
"loosely structured, somewhat opaque area of law in which the
generality of the legal standard left room for the exercise of judi-
cial discretion." 20 The Areeda and Turner article, on the other
hand, presented an alternative to this "amorphous legal doctrine"
in
a well conceived economic theory joined to a proposed rule of law. Anchored
squarely on the economic theory of the firm, expounded through standard
economic diagrams, and exhibiting a sharp awareness of the constraints of
the legal process, the Areeda-Turner proposal presented a beguilingly simple
legal standard: short run marginal cost pricing. This standard simultaneously
offered the axiomatic certainty of scientifically deduced truth, and the ad-
ministrative advantage of a drastically simplified legal rule.121
118. The most severely criticized opinion on this point is the trial court's decision in
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Contihental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), rev'd, 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981). See Brodley & Hay, supra note 34, at 768;
Greer, supra note 53. Some judges have used their own opinions to identify and correct the
technical errors of their colleagues. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481
F. Supp. 965, 992 & n.65 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31,
1980) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp)
v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979), and the district court's opinion in Murphy
Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
aff'd sub nom. Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for
cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1982) (No. 81-1323).
119. For a description of the Areeda/Turner rule, see notes 43-48 supra and accompa-
nying text.
120. Brodley & Hay, supra note 34, at 792.
121. Id. at 792-93. Brodley & Hay suggest that although the Areeda/Turner article in
1975 was attuned to the capabilities of the judicial process, their lucid combination of eco-
nomic and legal analysis was what made their proposal especially influential, even though in
the 1960s both Professor McGee and the Neal Report had suggested cost-based tests of
their own for addressing predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act. See REPORT OF
THE WHiTE HousE TASK FORCE ON ANTrrRUST POLICY (NEAL REPORT), 411 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1 (May 27, 1969); McGee, supra note 34.
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With narrowly drawn qualifications, some courts-most nota-
bly the Fifth Circuit in International Air Industries, Inc. v. Amer-
ican Excelsior Co.122 and the Ninth Circuit in Hanson v. Shell Oil
Co. 1 2 -promptly embraced the Areeda/Turner rule, at least in
part because of the two courts' belief that the rule represented a
widely accepted economic view.124 Several years of critical com-
mentary on this standard, however, made it clear that any pre-
sumed consensus on the marginal cost test was illusory.1 25 Because
of this sharp academic debate, the Fifth Circuit subsequently has
implicitly voiced second thoughts about its International Air posi-
tion,1 28 and the Ninth Circuit has retreated considerably from its
122. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
123. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Affirming the
trial court's directed verdict for the defendant, the court adopted an especially strict inter-
pretation of the marginal cost rule. The court stated that plaintiff's failure to show pricing
below marginal or average variable cost constituted "a failure as a matter of law to present a
prima facie case under Section 2." Id. at 1359.
124. Id. at 1358-59; International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714, 723-25 & n. 21 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
125. As discussed in part II supra, many scholars have taken issue with the Areeda!
Turner marginal cost proposal. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 24; Scherer, supra note 36;
Williamson, supra note 21.
126. See Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1981) (No. 81-874). In Malcolm an independent gasoline re-
tailer alleged that defendant oil companies conspired to discipline him for his discount mar-
keting strategy by collusively selling their gasoline below cost. The lower court directed a
verdict for defendants on the ground that Malcolm had failed to prove the fact of injury and
the amount of damages. The trial judge did not address the liability standard. The Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded. For purposes of the appeal, the court assumed that plaintiff
had "sufficiently alleged and proved actions in violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 847. In
a lengthy footnote, which cited several circuit cases-including International Air-the court
stated that "[tihe Courts of Appeal have recently shown varying degrees of favor toward
cost-based tests such as the test proposed by Areeda & Turner." Id. at 854 n.17. The court
then recounted the debate over the desirability of various tests:
This consideration of cost-based tests meets with mixed results. Professors Areeda and
Turner would generally welcome such a trend. And these developments have been
hailed by others.. . . But, as noted above, Professor Sullivan has an aversion to cost-
based tests, and following the beginning of this trend, scholars have voiced objections
to the accuracy and hence desirability of Areeda and Turner's cost-based test ...
This Court need not presently offer its views on this debate. But before he may get
his case to a jury, Malcolm must establish the existence of the substantive violation of
predatory pricing in the time period and markets for which he intends to claim dam-
ages. On this appeal, he is greatly aided by our assumption that he proved the substan-
tive violation alleged.
Id. (citations omitted).
What this footnote portends for future Fifth Circuit decisions is, of course, a matter of
speculation. Judge Tuttle, who wrote the Malcolm opinion, and Judge Godbold, who sat on
the Malcolm panel, were both members of the International Air court. On the one hand, it
is not surprising that the court did not use the occasion to announce its continued adher-
ence to the International Air position, since the Malcolm appeal did not require a ruling on
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holding in Hanson.127 The critical academic commentary and the
shift in position by some circuit courts also have prompted at least
two district courts to modify substantially their initial adherence
to relatively firm marginal cost rules.
128
These substantial and relatively rapid modifications that some
courts have made of their original standards are important for two
reasons. First, they graphically demonstrate the pervasive influ-
ence that academicians have exerted on the courts' analyses of
predatory pricing law. Each round of commentary has stimulated
corresponding attempts by courts to incorporate these new insights
into their decisions. Judicial experience in applying the academic
proposals in turn has prompted further scholarship to reexamine
and refine previous proposals in light of their practical effects. This
dialectic should continue to shape the growth of predatory pricing
doctrine.
1 29
Second, these changes have suggested that the a principal pol-
icy basis for articulating definitive per se standards-the need for
both predictability, which enables businesses to plan their affairs,
the pricing standard. On the other hand, the tone and content of Judge Tuttle's remarks,
which emphasized the diversity of judicial views and the evolving, sometimes sharp debate
among antitrust scholars, may indicate the court's willingness in future cases to consider
approaches that depart from the International Air formula.
127. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d
917 (9th Cir. 1981). Speaking for the court, Judge Sneed wrote,
[W]e hold that to establish predatory pricing a plaintiff must prove that the antici-
pated benefits of defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or eliminate
competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability to reap the benefits of
monopoly power. If the defendant's prices were below average total cost but above av-
erage variable cost, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing defendant's pricing was
predatory. If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below aver-
age variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory pricing
and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were justified without
regard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have on competitors.
Id. at 940. For a discussion of this burden-shifting approach, see notes 136-42, 171-82 infra
and accompanying text. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553,
559 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
128. Compare Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491
F. Supp. 1199 (D. Hawaii 1980) (summary judgment entered for failure to show pricing
below average variable cost) and Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,498
(S.D. Ohio 1979) (suggesting a marginal cost standard and relying upon authorities endors-
ing such a test) with Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 726, 738
(D. Hawaii 1981) (purely cost-based tests "ignore important factors going to the motive and
intent of the actor") and Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1
Trade Cas. 63,947 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (allowing a presumption of legality for pricing above
average variable cost that may be rebutted by evidence of intent and entry barriers).
129. Professor Easterbrook has stated that "[t]here is a highly competitive market for
predatory pricing theories," and that he sees no sign which would indicate that this rivalry
will diminish soon. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 263.
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and continuity, which helps to build a dependable body of prece-
dent-may not be well served by rapid adoption of a per se stan-
dard in an area subject to continuing major doctrinal development.
Only three years after its virtually unqualified adoption of the
Areeda/Turner standard in Hanson, the Ninth Circuit, acknowl-
edging the vigorous academic debate over predatory pricing, stated
that "refinement of the marginal or average variable cost test will
be necessary as future cases arise." ' Less than two years later, the
same court abandoned its per se Hanson approach for a test that
held pricing below average variable cost to create only a burden-
shifting presumption of predation and invited a broader evaluation
of the reasonableness of pricing above average variable cost.""'
This sort of reversal strongly suggests the undesirability of ap-
proaches that entail initial judicial acceptance of relatively rigid
rules, but which require a subsequent, abrupt revision of those
rules as academic understanding of the issue changes. For the fu-
ture, the courts should instead rely mainly upon rebuttable pre-
sumptions that permit the parties to demonstrate, within limits,
the reasonableness or unreasonabless of the different pricing strat-
egies. This form of bounded, rule of reason inquiry is better suited
to incremental change through a gradual absorption of new eco-
nomic theory.13 2 Even though such approaches admittedly would
not provide the clarity of a conclusive per se standard, they at least
would allow for more predictability and continuity than is now
available.
2. Evolving Legal Standards
Although the literature and case law are likely to continue to
130. California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743 (9th
Cir. 1979).
131. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
132. In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Inc., 652 F.2d
917 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit stated that the proper method for minimizing the
risks of adopting too lenient or too harsh a standard was "to eschew dogmatic adherence to
a particular, rigid test and to fashion broad and flexible objective standards concerned with
accurately evaluating the purposes of business behavior." Id. at 935 n.18. Professors Brodley
and Hay have suggested that the courts' relatively uncritical acceptance of the Areeda/Tur-
ner test and their subsequent retreat in the face of critical commentary "raises questions,
bound to become more pressing in a scientific age, of how courts should use new develop-
ments in economic or scientific theory." Brodley & Hay, supra note 34, at 794. They con-
clude their article by asking whether it would not be appropriate to have a "renewed em-
phasis on the values and insights inlaid in long-standing judicial experience, built upon
case-by-case adjudication, and on the advantage of incremental policy change, achieved
gradually and with opportunity for self-correction." Id.
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undergo refinement, it is nevertheless possible to discern some gen-
eral standards in the courts' development of predatory pricing doc-
trine. This subsection discusses these doctrinal trends, first by re-
viewing the broad, overall presumptions that courts have
articulated for determining the legality of pricing behavior and
then by examining the specific factors that judges have emphasized
in the recent trend toward applying a bounded rule of reason anal-
ysis to allegedly predatory behavior. The subsection closes with a
brief eyaluation of both the possibility of and the potential
grounds for Supreme Court review of the issue of predatory
pricing.
(a) Basic Presumptions
Courts and commentators have identified three distinct pric-
ing zones that facilitate judicial analyses of business conduct: Pric-
ing at or above average total cost; pricing below marginal cost (or
reasonably anticipated average variable cost); and pricing at or
above marginal cost, but below average total cost. A basic starting
point for classifying the predatory pricing case law is to examine
the legal significance that courts have attached to pricing within
each of these zones. A companion inquiry is to determine whether
proof in these cases that a party priced within a particular zone in
itself resulted in a finding of liability-raising a conclusive pre-
sumption of illegality-or whether it merely shifted the burden of
proof to the opposing party to demonstrate the reasonableness of
its conduct-raising only a rebuttable presumption.
(1) Pricing At or Above Average Total Cost: A Conclusive
Presumption of Legality
To begin with the least controversial zone, no court has held
pricing at or above average total cost to be in and of itself illegal.
Indeed, the few opinions that have explicitly stated a legal rule for
pricing in this range have accorded the conduct per se legality.133
Other opinions that have stopped short of articulating a specific
rule invariably have absolved defendants of liability for pricing at
or above average total cost.13 4 Collectively, these decisions indicate
133. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
723 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Richter Concrete v. Hilltop Basic
Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. 63,947, at 75,883 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Transamerica Com-
puter Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 991 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-
4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D.N.J. 1977).
134. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th
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that most courts will conclusively presume the legality of pricing
above average total cost, even when the plaintiff seeks to establish
the impropriety of such behavior by pointing to market conditions
or independent evidence of intent. Although this trend appears to
be predominant, a few courts have expressly declined to endorse a
standard that would absolutely preclude all plaintiffs' attempts to
rebut a presumption of legality for pricing at or above average to-
tal cost.13 5
(2) Pricing Below Marginal Cost: A Rebuttable Presumption of
Illegality
Judicial treatments of conduct at the other extreme-pricing
below marginal cost-are slightly more complex, but still relatively
clear. The fundamental rule, which a number of courts have stated
in slightly different ways, treats pricing below marginal cost-or its
frequently used surrogate, reasonably anticipated average variable
cost-as presumptively illegal.1 $ The courts, however, have indi-
cated that the defendant may attempt to rebut the presumption in
various ways. For example, one district court has stated that a de-
fendant may argue that excess capacity warranted pricing below
average variable cost.137 Another district court has articulated a
version of the Robinson-Patman Act "meeting competition" de-
Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
135. In its recent Inglis decision the Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the legality of
pricing above average total cost, but remarked, "We emphasize that this case does not con-
cern the possibility of proving predatory conduct when a defendant's prices equal or exceed
average total cost. . . . We express no opinion on the permissibility of such a claim." Wil-
liam Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917, 939 n.30 (9th
Cir. 1981).
One other possible exception to this trend is the Federal Trade Commission's DuPont
decision, which evaluated the respondent's pricing above average total cost in the light of
other aspects of its investment and pricing conduct. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,770, at 21,981 (Oct. 20, 1980). See also In re Borden, Inc.
(ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669, 805 n.39 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
1979).
136. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652
F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079); International Air Indus.,
Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975). See also In re Borden, Inc.
(ReaLemon) 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1979).
For a discussion of the situation in which marginal cost exceeds average cost, see notes 43-44
supra and accompanying text.
137. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp.
410, 418-19 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
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fense.138 Under this principle, a firm may drop its prices as low as
necessary to meet its competitor's prices, even though pricing at
that level will not cover marginal costs.139 Yet another way in
which a defendant may be able to rebut a presumption of illegality
for below marginal cost pricing is to show that ease of entry would
permit actual and potential rivals to deny defendant the possible
rewards of a submarginal cost pricing strategy.140 Finally, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.14 1 held that a defendant may attempt to
prove that its prices were "loss minimizing," even though they
were below marginal cost.
1 42
(3) Pricing At or Above Marginal Cost but Below Average
Total Cost: A Bounded Rule of Reason Standard
The third-and most complex-zone of pricing that facilitates
judicial analysis is the region between average total cost and mar-
ginal cost. Although the opinions on this subject frequently pro-
vide strong suggestions of definitive standards for evaluating pric-
ing in this range, they also contain sufficient qualifications or
ambiguities to make any firm generalization treacherous. Never-
theless, the cases give enough indications of the courts' attitudes to
provide a basis for the identification of developing trends. Cases
that have dealt with pricing within this range have focused upon
three possible standards for legality: (1) Pricing at or above margi-
nal cost but below average total cost is conclusively presumed le-
gal; (2) pricing at or above marginal cost but below average total
cost is presumed legal, but the plaintiff can rebut the presumption
by citing factors that demonstrate an anticompetitive purpose and
effect-including evidence of intent, entry conditions, or other per-
nicious conduct; and (3) pricing within this range is presumed ille-
gal, but the defendant can rebut the presumption through the
same type of evidence that was noted above in the discussion of
below marginal cost pricing. The difference between the second
138. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. (Memorex) v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3126 (1981).
139. Id. at 433-34.
140. See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 854 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
141. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982)
(No. 81-1079).
142. Id. at 91 n.24. The court stated that loss minimizing prices "are inconsistent with




and third standards is that the third standard would require a
lesser amount of proof for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case and shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
defendant.
No opinion yet has held unequivocally that firms enjoy com-
plete immunity from liability for their pricing decisions when their
prices equal or exceed their marginal costs. By the tone and rea-
soning of their decisions, however, some courts have come ex-
tremely close to adopting this type of absolute pricing rule. The
Second Circuit's opinion in Northeastern Telephone illustrates the
application of a nearly conclusive presumption of legality standard,
one which leaves a firm that prices at or above marginal cost in
virtually no legal jeopardy.14 3 Although the court's opinion may
permit some review of prices above marginal cost when entry barri-
ers are high,1 44 the decision is otherwise a complete endorsement of
the Areeda/Turner marginal cost standard.14 5 In Northeastern
Telephone the Second Circuit overturned a sixteen and one-half
million dollar jury verdict that plaintiff, a telephone equipment
supplier, had won against defendants American Telephone & Tele-
graph Company (AT&T), Western Electric Corporation, and
Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET)-the Bell
operating affiliate serving Connecticut. The court also reversed the
trial court's findings that defendants had used anticompetitive
pricing, advertising, product introduction, and marketing strategies
to protect their monopoly position in the sale of telephone equip-
ment.146 The most significant aspect of the Second Circuit's opin-
ion, however, is its intimation that pricing below marginal cost is
essential to a "prima facie case of predatory pricing. 1 47
143. Id. at 86-93.
144. Id. at 88-89.
145. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
146. Northeastern had challenged defendants' conduct under both monopolization and
attempt to monopolize theories. For the purposes of its opinion, the Second Circuit assumed
that defendants possessed monopoly power in the relevant market. 651 F.2d at 85. With
defendants' "power to control prices and to exclude entry" assumed, the sole issue before
the court was whether their conduct was anticompetitive. Id.
The court ordered a new trial on Northeastern's claims that defendants had designed
an unnecessarily expensive and inconvenient protective coupling device to deter people from
purchasing plaintiff's goods and connecting them to the Bell network. Id. at 94-95. For a
discussion of the court's treatment of the coupler issues, as well as of Northeastern's adver-
tising and product introduction claims, see notes 210-11, 221-28 infra and accompanying
text.
147. 651 F.2d at 91. The Northeastern opinion does not contain an explicit endorse-
ment of a conclusive presumption of legality for pricing at or above marginal cost. The court
expressed its general rule of decision in terms that were not absolute:
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Four considerations prompted the Northeastern Telephone
court to adopt the marginal cost test. First, the court concluded
that a marginal cost rule would best serve the Sherman Act's com-
petition policy goals. 48 Second, the court accepted the view of sev-
eral commentators that predation seldom occurs in practice and
thus does not warrant stringent scrutiny. The court stated that
"[t]here is considerable evidence, derived from historical sources
and from economic teaching, that predation is rare. . . .This does
We agree with Areeda and Turner that in the general case at least, the relationship
between a firm's prices and its marginal costs provides the best single determinant of
predatory pricing. Thus prices below reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be pre-
sumed predatory, while prices above reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be pre-
sumed non-predatory.
Id. at 88 (emphasis added). This sort of modestly qualifying language is characteristic of the
opinions that have adopted a rigid marginal cost rule most completely. See, e.g., Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing, but not deciding, the
availability of an entry barriers exception to an otherwise conclusive presumption of legality
for pricing at or above marginal cost), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Thus, Northeast-
ern would appear to permit-at least in principle-a litigant in the Second Circuit to argue
that the special circumstances of its case warrant scrutiny of prices at or above marginal
cost. For the reasons mentioned in the text accompanying notes 148-56, infra, however, it is
also apparent that the Northeastern panel would place an especially heavy burden of per-
suasion on the party which sought to prove the illegality of pricing at or above marginal
cost. Unlike other recent circuit court decisions dealing with predatory pricing, Northeast-
ern gave only the faintest indication of what-if any-conditions would create liability for
pricing above marginal cost.
148. The court suggested,
Adopting marginal cost as the proper test of predatory pricing is consistent with the
procompetitive thrust of the Sherman Act. When the price of a dominant firm's prod-
uct equals the product's marginal costs, "only less efficient firms will suffer larger losses
per unit of output; more efficient firms will be losing less or even operating profitably."
[Areeda & Turner, supra note 6, at 711]. Marginal cost pricing thus fosters competition
on the basis of relative efficiency. Establishing a pricing floor above marginal cost
would encourage underutilization of productive resources and would provide a price
"umbrella" under which less efficient firms could hide from the stresses and storms of
competition.
Id. at 87 (footnote omitted). The court did acknowledge that allowing a monopolist to drop
its prices to its marginal costs could cause even a more efficient firm to lose money, but it
concluded that such losses were "unlikely to have any serious anticompetitive effects" be-
cause the predator would suffer even greater losses. Id. at 87 n.14. The court reasoned that
[i]f the monopolist's marginal-cost price is below its average cost, not only will it be
incurring greater losses per unit of output than the more efficient firm, but it will suffer
those losses over a much greater range of output, since it will be making the vast ma-
jority of sales in the market. That the monopolist will suffer more than its rival will
tend to negate whatever competitive benefits the monopolist may derive from its pre-
sumably superior wealth. Moreover, since the monopolist will have to raise his price
eventually, the rival has a strong incentive to stay in the market, because its profits will
exceed those of the monopolist at the new, higher price. See generally [McGee, supra
note 34, at 295-97].
Id. at 87 n.14.
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not mean, of course, that this behavior should no longer be deemed
anticompetitive. But the rarity of the phenomenon informs our de-
cision as to the appropriate legal definition. '149
Third, the court believed that a strict marginal cost test could
be applied simply and expressed concern about the ability of
courts to implement correctly a standard that is any more com-
plex. Emphasizing the "limits of the judicial process and the reali-
ties of the marketplace," 150 the court pointed out that "[c]ourts oc-
casionally err in applying even the clearest legal rules. The more
complicated the standard, the greater the chance for misapplica-
tion."15' Specifically, the court questioned the administrability of
rules that would require judges to assess the probable long-term
effects of a firm's pricing strategy 52 and proposed that an average
total cost test also might raise technical accounting problems that
would be considerably more difficult than those presented under a
marginal cost standard. 5"
Last, the court found that entry into the telephone equipment
market was relatively unimpeded.'" To support its finding, the
court pointed out that two businessmen had formed Northeastern
in 1972 with a capital investment of $1000, and the company's an-
149. Id. at 88. On this point, the court appears to have attached great importance to
the Areeda/Turner treatise, as well as to Professor McGee's 1980 predatory pricing article.
See 3 P. AREEDA and D. TURNER, supra note 37; McGee, supra note 34.
150. 651 F.2d at 88.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 87-88 n.15. The court conceded in principle that a rule which considered
long-run factors would be superior to a standard such as the Areeda/Turner test that fo-
cused solely on short-term consumer welfare. The court, however, stated that "we despair
that economists will ever formulate workable criteria for reaching this goal. Certainly Scher-
er's approach [a full rule of reason analysis] cannot be applied in a judicial setting." Id.
Nevertheless, beyond dismissing Scherer's method, see notes 61-63 supra and accompanying
text, which arguably is the most intricate and complicated approach, the court's opinion
failed to address other recent proposals such as the Joskow and Klevorick test, which seeks
to enable judges to assess long-term effects at a tolerable administrative cost. See notes 15-
17, 39 supra and notes 320-29 infra and accompanying text. The absence in the Northeast-
ern opinion of any discussion of the Joskow/Klevorick approach for weighing long-term ef-
fects is curious in the light of the frequency with which the court drew upon other elements
of the Joskow/Klevorick article to support its reasoning. See, e.g., 651 F.2d at 86-89.
153. The court stated that
the more demanding average cost test of predatory pricing gives rise to serious
problems when applied to a diversified enterprise. This is because the accounting con-
ventions used to allocate joint costs, i.e., those costs that are not directly attributable
to a particular product, are all arbitrary to a degree.
651 F.2d at 89 n.19. For a further discussion of allocation and measurement problems, see
notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
154. 651 F.2d at 89.
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nual revenues had grown to $3 million by 1978.155 Plaintiff's expe-
rience indicated to the court that "barriers to entry into the busi-
ness telephone equipment market were relatively low," and that
the market "was not conducive to a policy of unremunerative
pricing."156
Although Northeastern Telephone makes extensive use of
modern developments in economic theory in analyzing allegedly
predatory behavior, the case today represents a minority view
among courts that have addressed the legality of pricing between
marginal cost and average total cost. Most recent opinions have
acknowledged that marginal cost is an important benchmark for
analyzing claims of predation, but they have refused to make it an
almost exclusive measure of lawfulness. In Pacific Engineering &
Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,157 for example, the Tenth
Circuit gave considerable attention to the marginal cost test, but it
also found that other elements were relevant to its analysis. Speak-
ing for the court, Judge Hill stated,
We believe that evidence of marginal cost or average variable cost is ex-
tremely beneficial in establishing a case of monopolization through predatory
pricing....
Although we do not intend to adopt a solely cost-based test, there are no
other relevant factors indicating [this defendant's] conduct was anticompeti-
tive even in the long run.
1 58
Thus, the content and depth of plaintiff's case, and not any reluc-
tance to evaluate other pertinent criteria-including those factors
that might help predict long-run effects-apparently was what lim-
ited the scope of the court's inquiry.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel
155. Id. at 80, 89 n.18.
156. Id. at 89. This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the court's assumption
that defendants possessed the "power to control prices and exclude entry" in the relevant
market. Id. at 85.
157. 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). In Pacific Engineer-
ing, the Tenth Circuit reversed a nonjury verdict that Kerr-McGee had monopolized and
attempted to monopolize the market for ammonium perchlorate, a major component of solid
rocket fuel. Among other practices, Pacific Engineering alleged that defendant had priced
below cost to obtain supply contracts with the federal government, which was the fuel's sole
purchaser.
158. Id. at 797. The court did not expressly indicate what other factors might be rele-
vant, but its extensive discussion of the substantial excess capacity in the industry-the
capacity of each firm exceeded total demand-suggests that it excused defendant's sales at




Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp.59 rejected the notion that otherwise
relevant factors should be ignored in a predation case because they
are too difficult to apply. The court observed that marginal cost
indeed was "a relevant and an extremely useful factor," but it re-
jected a pure marginal cost test.160 Instead, the court stated that it
would "consider the presence of other factors" in determining
whether plaintiff had made an adequate prima facie showing of at-
tempted monopolization.' The court criticized Areeda's and Tur-
ner's willingness, through application of a marginal cost standard,
"to allow damage to competition and the destruction, by one com-
petitor, of equally efficient competitors as long as prices remain at
or above marginal costs.' 6 2 Unpersuaded by the two scholars' ar-
gument that no administrable test could be developed to eliminate
this risk, the court noted that "Section 2 of the Sherman Act
makes no exceptions for cases involving administrative
difficulty. '"'6
As discussed above, 64 the Fifth and Ninth Circuits recently
have expressed misgivings about their earlier decisions that largely
had adopted the Areeda/Turner approach. The Ninth Circuit's
opinion in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continential
Baking Co.'65 placed the burden of proof on plaintiff to show that
defendant's pricing between average variable and average total
cost was predatory. 6 In explaining its position, the court point-
edly rejected arguments that average variable cost alone was an
appropriate standard by which to judge predation. Instead of an
either/or approach based on "rigid adherence to a particular cost-
based rule,1' 7 the court chose to evaluate the "reasonableness" of
prices below average total cost and above average variable cost. 68
159. 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 432. In Chillicothe the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict for Martin Marietta, which plaintiff had accused of attempting to monopolize the
central Illinois sand and gravel market.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. For Professor Areeda's response to the court's comment, see Areeda, supra
note 37, at 900.
164. See notes 122-28 supra and accompanying text.
165. 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
166. See note 127 supra.
167. 652 F.2d at 939. Cf. 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981)
(announcing a preference for the Areeda/Turner test, but declining to endorse formally a
specific standard), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-
1116).
168. The court used average variable cost as a surrogate for marginal cost. 652 F.2d at
939; see notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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The court found that, in a particuar case, "[p]redation exists when
the justification of these prices is based, not on their effectiveness
in minimizing losses, but on their tendency to eliminate rivals and
create a market structure enabling the seller to recoup his
losses. '169 Several major, recent district court opinions have taken
the same general approach as the Ninth Circuit in Inglis and
adopted a bounded rule of reason analysis that uses a rebuttable
presumption to evaluate prices between marginal cost and average
total cost.170 The specific grounds upon which courts have relied in
this trend toward evaluating the reasonableness of pricing above
marginal cost and below average total cost is discussed next.
(b) Reasonableness of Pricing Between Marginal Cost and
Average Total Cost
The controversy over the appropriate standard for evaluating
allegedly predatory behavior has focused increasing attention on a
defendant's pricing between marginal cost and average total cost.
As a preface to reviewing judicial analysis of pricing in this inter-
mediate range, it is useful to note again two consistent principles
of judicial evaluations of predatory pricing allegations to date. On
the one hand, no court has adopted the position suggested by
Bork, Easterbrook, and others that antitrust law should completely
disregard predatory pricing.7 On the other hand, no decision has
openly accepted Scherer's rule of reason analysis, which considers
a wide variety of potentially relevant factors and essentially rejects
all purely cost-based standards.112 Instead, courts on the whole
have avoided both these extremes and have followed an approach
that treats prices above average total cost as presumptively legal,
prices below marginal cost as presumptively illegal, and prices be-
tween these two boundaries as presumptively legal, but subject to
a rule of reason analysis.
The courts have stated that several factors are relevant to an
evaluation of the reasonableness of a defendant's pricing between
169. 652 F.2d at 939.
170. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,277 (D.D.C. 1981);
Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. 63,947 (S.D.
Ohio 1981).
171. See notes 35 & 60 supra and accompanying text. Even courts that believe preda-
tion is rare-for example,, the Second Circuit in Northeastern Telephone-have expressly
refused to dismiss it altogether. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
172. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
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marginal cost and average total cost. The first of these factors is
proof of market conditions, particularly entry barriers. The court
in International Air, which was the first opinion to adopt the
Areeda/Turner proposal, recognized the potential usefulness of en-
try conditions for evaluating the competitive consequences of pric-
ing within this range. 17  The Fifth Circuit in International Air
held that a plaintiff must show that its competitor either is pricing
below average variable cost or "is charging a price below its short-
run, profit-maximizing price and barriers to entry are great enough
to enable the discriminator to reap the benefits of predation before
new entry is possible."
17 4
Although some courts have expressly declined to decide the
legal relevance of an entry barrier analysis,7 5 others have followed
the lead of the International Air court and have held that these
conditibns are an important factor for assessing the competitive ef-
fects of pricing in the intermediate range.1 76 Moreover, some opin-
ions are particularly noteworthy for their care and sophistication
in evaluating the height and significance of entry barriers in the
pertinent markets. 17 7 The courts' experience to date suggests that
if courts assess market conditions and entry barriers as part of an
analysis of market power in monopolization and attempt-to-mo-
nopolize cases, then they most likely will incur only a modest addi-
tional administrative burden in applying the results from that in-
quiry to examine the long-term effects of a particular pricing
strategy.
A second important factor for reviewing prices above marginal
cost but below average total cost has been the defendant's intent.
Many decisions have held that plaintiffs may introduce evidence,
in addition to proof of below-cost pricing, that purports to show a
173. International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652
F.2d 917, 937 n.26 (9th Cir. 1981).
176. See, e.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade
Cas. 63,947, at 75,885 n.4, 75,892 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM
Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 988-89 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir.
Jan. 31, 1980); In re Borden, Inc. (ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669, 791 (1978), appeal docketed,
No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1979).
177. The Richter court's analysis, for example, included a review of minimum scale
capital requirements, the history of entry and exit during the complaint period, and the
disposition of assets owned by firms that had left the market. Richter Concrete Corp. v.
Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. 63,947, at 15,892 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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predatory design behind the defendant's pricing practices. 17 Fi-
nally, although intent and entry conditions are the most frequently
mentioned factors, some opinions have declined to "foreclose the
possibility that ...other aspects of its conduct"179 may also be
relevant to the permissibility of a firm's pricing activity.
These opinions suggest that a particular court is likely to
adopt one of two approaches in its assessment of the reasonable-
ness of pricing within this middle range. A court that is largely
unconvinced of the need for heavy policing of pricing activity is
more likely to choose a standard that is, with a few exceptions,
based solely on marginal cost and to evaluate a relatively small
number and variety of additional factors. This approach generally
will require the plaintiff to make a stronger showing of particular
harms caused by the alleged predatory conduct. By contrast, a
court that is more sympathetic to the potential harms of predation
is more likely to evaluate a wider range of factors.180 This differ-
ence may reflect deeper, theoretical disagreements about the fre-
quency and competitive harms of predatory activity.181 As a stan-
dard for adjudication, the broader analysis may be better adapted
to producing more accurate results in a wide range of factual situa-
tions than a strict per se approach. The question whether the ap-
parent difficulties in administering the more complex test outweigh
its advantages,8 2 however, can be answered only by its implemen-
tation in resolving predatory pricing claims.
178. See, e.g., SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,316, at 74,415-
16 (8th Cir. 1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 348-49 (3d Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116); William Inglis & Sons Bak-
ing Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1981); Chillicothe
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1980). See also
notes 96-104 supra and accompanying text.
179. California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 (9th
Cir. 1979). The court noted that "limit pricing by a monopolist might, on a record which
presented the issue, be held an impermissible predatory practice." Id. at 743. See also Chil-
licothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980);
Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977).
180. Compare Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade
Cas. 63,947 (S.D. Ohio 1981) and California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM
Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) with Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079) and Han-
son v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
181. See note 15 supra.
182. See notes 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
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(c) Supreme Court Review
Given the rapidity with which the trends in predatory pricing
analysis have developed, the various federal circuit courts predict-
ably are not in full agreement on the appropriate standards for
evaluating pricing claims. In terms of analytical sophistication
alone, however, the circuits that have decided a greater number of
cases-especially the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit-have
developed a more comprehensive legal and economic approach.
Since the publication of Areeda's and Turner's article in 1975,
courts in every circuit except the Fourth Circuit have addressed
the issue of the appropriate economic analysis for claims of preda-
tion.1"" No circuit has accorded the Supreme Court's 1967 Utah
183. Only district court opinions are available in the Sixth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit. Apparently, the new Eleventh Circuit will adopt as governing precedent
the decisions of its parent, the Fifth Circuit. A summary of the current standards for each
circuit are set out below to put into context this Article's discussion of the developing trends
in predation analysis.
The First Circuit has not expressly endorsed any specific cost-based pricing rule. It has
suggested, however, that a plaintiff at least must allege that the defendant possesses market
power or is engaged in "persistent pricing below short-run out-of-pocket costs." Americana
Indus., Inc. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 556 F.2d 625, 628 (1st Cir. 1977).
The leading opinion in the Second Circuit is Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
See notes 143-56 supra and accompanying text. The court in Northeastern Telephone cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption of liability upon proof that pricing was below marginal cost.
Pricing at or above marginal cost, on the other hand, was presumed lawful, except perhaps
in a market with high entry barriers.
The Third Circuit's opinion in 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116), suggests a re-
buttable presumption of illegality for pricing below marginal cost and a rebuttable presump-
tion of legality for pricing at or above marginal cost. Under the Third Circuit's standard,
evidence of intent-or a lack thereof-is sufficient to rebut either presumption. Id. at 349-
50.
The Fourth Circuit has no reported opinions on the question of predation since 1975.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a marginal cost test in which prices below marginal cost
are rebuttably presumed to be unlawful. Pricing at or above marginal cost, however, is law-
ful, unless the plaintiff can prove that the defendant is pricing below its "short-run," profit-
maximizing price and that substantial entry barriers exist. International Air Indus., Inc. v.
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
A more recent case, however, suggests that the circuit may be receptive to a more flexible
reasonableness standard. Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1981) (No. 81-874); see note 126 supra.
Although the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the issue, several district court opinions
have adopted a rebuttable presumption test, in which prices equal to or above average varia-
ble cost are presumed legal. See, e.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources,
Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. % 63,947 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Hillside Dairy Co. v. Fairmont Foods Co.,
1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,313 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
The Seventh Circuit in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615
F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980), found marginal cost to be "a relevant and an extremely useful
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Pie decision a dominant role in evaluating the propriety of the de-
fendant's conduct. 184 Thus, the time appears ripe for the Supreme
Court to clarify its position further.
The judicial development of predatory pricing standards poses
at least two possible grounds for Supreme Court review. The first
would be to resolve the differences among the circuits in their use
of cost standards. The Court, for example, could examine the im-
portant differences in emphasis and approach in the circuits' appli-
cation of presumptions to examine pricing in the zone between av-
erage total cost and marginal cost. The Court might also wish to
identify the nature and significance of those market conditions and
business motivations that justify pricing in this range.185
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court is concerned with
harmonizing the various lower court opinions, it may want to grant
certiorari to reconcile the recent wave of predation decisions with
Utah Pie.' As discussed above,8 7 Utah Pie's doctrinal signifi-
cance for predatory pricing law is unclear. Nevertheless, the recent
factor," but added that it would also "consider the presence of other factors" in assessing
pricing conduct. Id. at 432. Apparently, these other factors include intent and market condi-
tions evidence. See notes 159-63 supra and accompanying text.
The Eighth Circuit has adopted a rebuttable presumption of legality for prices at or
above marginal cost. SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,316 (8th Cir.
1981). In United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1122 (1976), the court placed a premium on both intent and entry barriers as factors show-
ing the likely success of the practice and, therefore, the legality of different pricing
strategies.
Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have adopted reasonableness standards based on
average variable or marginal cost tests, but each court accepts evidence of other relevant
factors to demonstrate the anticompetitive effect of the defendant's prices that are below
average total cost but equal or exceed average variable or marginal cost. See William Inglis
& Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 979
(1981); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 977 (1977).
The District of Columbia Circuit has not adopted a predation standard, but the district
court has endorsed a rule of reason analysis for pricing between average variable cost and
average total cost. United States v. AT&T Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,277 (D.D.C. 1981).
184. Although several district court decisions have given Utah Pie substantial weight
in analyzing pricing conduct, see, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT-Grinnell Corp., 1980-81
Trade Cas. 1 63,862, at 78,572 (D. Mass. 1981), most circuit courts, however, have gone to
great lengths to distinguish the case and thereby limit its applicability. See, e.g., 0. Hommel
Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3516 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 81-1116); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
185. See notes 143-82 supra and accompanying text.
186. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
187. For a discussion of the current vitality of Utah Pie, see notes 92-108 supra and
accompanying text.
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cases in the area, particularly those that appear to require pricing
below marginal cost as essential to a prima facie predatory pricing
case,"' cannot be considered consistent with Utah Pie's language
or intent. Even if the Court still regards the result or reasoning of
the decision favorably, it may choose nonetheless to clarify Utah
Pie's applicability to modern pricing doctrine. In any event, given
the procedural status of current cases in the appellate courts, the
lower courts and commentators will have to struggle with the is-
sues concerning predatory pricing for at least one more year before
the Supreme Court has an opportunity to clarify the appropriate
doctrine in this area of the law.
B. Innovation
Recent predation cases have raised three especially notewor-
thy issues concerning the development and introduction of new
products or processes by dominant firms. The first deals with a
dominant firm's ability to make product design decisions that en-
able it to block entry into certain markets or to obtain a competi-
tive edge in markets for goods that are necessarily compatible with
its principal product. The suits in which Eastman Kodak Company
(Kodak),189 International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), 190
and AT&T 91 were involved have focused extensively on the com-
petitive implications of design changes. The second major issue is
the question of "predisclosure"-whether an innovating firm must
give its competitors substantial information about its anticipated
design changes well before the changes are implemented. 92 The
188. See, e.g.,; Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
189. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
190. California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. (Memorex) v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3126 (1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
191. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079); United States v. AT&T Co., 516 F. Supp.
1237 (D.D.C. 1981); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Co., [1981] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1019, at A-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.,
[1980] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969, at A-3 (N.D. Ill. 1980), appeals
docketed, Nos. 80-2171 and 80-2288 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 1980 and Sept. 28, 1980).
192. The first and second issues are often closely related. A dominant firm's rivals may
be less likely to object to design changes if they receive detailed information about them
1982]
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Second Circuit's opinion in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co.19' contains the most thorough analysis of this question.9 4 The
third issue concerns the dominant firm's research and development
investments in patenting that protect the firm's chief product from
possible substitutes. Patent accumulation, commonly known as
"blocking," has been an important element in attacks upon Xerox
Corporation's (Xerox) conduct in the plain paper office copier
market.
195
Before examining each of these issues individually, several dis-
tinctive features about both the substance and sources of judicial
thinking on innovation questions deserve mention. Compared with
the case law on pricing and promotion, the existing legal standards
for dominant firm, innovation-related conduct are relatively clear
and simple. The courts have immunized virtually all product de-
velopment efforts that yield goods which have some demonstrable
technical merit or consumer appeal. To date, only two types of
conduct have drawn judicial censure. First, several decisions have
condemned, at least in principle, dominant firm design changes
that were plainly intended to injure rivals and completely lacked
any technological justification. Second, the court in Berkey pro-
scribed a dominant firm's efforts in a joint venture to use its mar-
ket power to prevent its co-venturers from disclosing or introduc-
ing new products. 96
long before the new products reach the market.
193. 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). In Berkey plaintiff claimed that Kodak
violated § 2 of the Sherman Act (1) by using its monopoly in film to improve its position in
the amateur camera and photofinishing services markets, and (2) by using its monopoly in
film and color paper to extract supra-competitive prices for both of these goods. In addition,
plaintiff alleged that Kodak had violated § 1 of the Act by conspiring with flashlamp manu-
facturers to limit unlawfully the disclosure of a new flashcube. On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit overturned all but a small portion of the $87 million judgment that Berkey had won at
trial. 603 F.2d at 309-10. For a brief, useful discussion of Berkey's claims, see 93 HARv. L.
REv. 408 (1979).
194. Some dominant firms also have come under attack for the content of the infor-
mation that they released prior to the introduction of a new product. Plaintiffs in Berkey
and Northeastern Telephone, for example, claimed that defendants had promoted the ap-
pearance of new products in ways that unjustifiably exaggerated their qualities and deterred
purchases of plaintiffs' existing product lines. For a discussion of the issues concerning the
appropriate bounds of dominant firm promotional activities, see notes 260-91 infra and ac-
companying text.
195. Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1268 (D.N.J. 1979), afl'd,
631 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,
463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 102
S. Ct. 85 (1981). See also In re Xerox, 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (consent decree).
196. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
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Beyond these relatively narrow restrictions, the courts have
placed few apparent limits on either a dominant firm's choice of
product design changes or the timing and content of information
disclosures that precede new product introductions. The judiciary's
current tendency to allow dominant firms substantial flexibility in
the innovation area has at least three significant, possible explana-
tions. First, the courts regard innovation as a process with which
antitrust law should not interfere. The Berkey court perhaps ar-
ticulated this view most clearly when it stated that "[b]ecause...
a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to com-
pete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve
through 'the process of invention and innovation' is clearly toler-
ated by the antitrust laws.'1 7 The FTC also emphasized this pol-
icy goal in its recent decision in In re DuPont de Nemours Co., 1 98
which absolved DuPont of any liability for using a technological
cost advantage to increase its share of the titanium dioxide market.
Speaking for the Commission, Commissioner Clanton stated that
DuPont's manufacturing innovation, which was accomplished in
the 1940s and 1950s but only became advantageous in the 1970s,
"reflect[ed] the kind of skill and foresight that should be en-
couraged."' 9 The Commissioner explained the policy tensions be-
tween permitting unlimited innovation-whatever its eventual ef-
fect on competition-and enforcing the antitrust laws:
It may be that DuPont ultimately will achieve a monopoly share of the mar-
ket. As its share increases, other firms may find it harder to capture the effi-
ciencies enjoyed by DuPont due to the scale economies associated with...
[DuPont's manufacturing] process. Those effects should be weighed carefully,
and we have done so. Antitrust policy wisely disfavors monopoly, but it also
seeks to promote vigorous competitive behavior. Indeed, the essence of the
competitive process is to induce firms to become more efficient and to pass
the benefits of the efficiency along to consumers. That process would be ill-
nied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Justice Rehnquist seriously questioned the wisdom of this hold-
ing in his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Berkey. See note 239
infra.
197. 603 F.2d at 281 (citations omitted). Later in the opinion, the court stated that
"any firm, even a monopolist, may generally bring its products to market whenever and
however it chooses." Id. at 286. The court also noted that although Congress' central con-
cern in passing the Sherman Act was monopoly power, judicial decisions virtually always
have held that Congress did not proscribe the mere possession of monopoly power. Instead,
Congress intended liability to be imposed only when anticompetitive conduct created or
maintained such power. Id. at 274-75. In the Berkey court's view this legislative mandate
stems from congressional recognition of the importance both of preserving incentives for
growth through competitive behavior and innovation, and of ensuring fair treatment of
firms that have become dominant as a result of engaging in these practices. Id. at 274.
198. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,770 (1980).
199. Id. at 21,984.
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served by using antitrust to block hard, aggressive competition that is solidly
based on efficiencies and growth opportunities, even if monopoly is a possible
result. 00
Thus, courts tend on grounds of policy to disfavor interpretations
of the antitrust laws that might- restrain innovation-related
conduct.
A second plausible explanation for the courts' approach to in-
novation issues is their perception that few manageable standards
exist for evaluating claims of predatory innovation. Particularly in
the product design area, innovation-related allegations often re-
quire courts to weigh a product's benefits against its anticompeti-
tive characteristics. This task can often be an evaluation of im-
ponderables, predominantly because the benefits are largely a
matter of consumer taste. Indeed, courts clearly are wary of pursu-
ing such an inquiry beyond examining the performance of the
product in the market. Judge Kaufman in Berkey explained the
dangers of evaluating the superiority of one product over another
as follows:
A product that commends itself to many users because superior in certain
respects may be rendered unsatisfactory to others by flaws they considered
fatal ....
[I]n such circumstances no one can determine with any reasonable assur-
ance whether one product is "superior" to another. Preference is a matter of
individual taste. The only question that can be answered is whether there is
sufficient demand for a particular product to make its production worthwhile,
and the response, so long as the free choice of consumers is preserved, can
only be inferred from the reaction of the market. 01
Beyond applying this type of market test, no court has attempted
to second-guess a dominant firm's product design decision in light
of possible alternative designs with arguably less exclusionary po-
tential. Judge Conti in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. (Memorex)
v. IBM Corp.202 expressed this prevailing judicial disposition to re-
strict severely such engingeering disputes in the courtroom when
he stated that if both alternatives arguably are justified from an
engineering perspective, then "the court will not allow itself to be
enmeshed 'in a technical inquiry into the justifiability of product
200. Id. at 21,985. The language in DuPont and Berkey is consistent with a longstand-
ing judicial solicitude for innovation. Judge Learned Hand, for example, earlier had ex-
pressed the need to protect the businessman who "may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors ... by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry." United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
201. 603 F.2d at 286-87.
202. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v.




The third possible reason for the courts' extreme caution in
analyzing innovation issues stems from an extensive body of eco-
nomic literature which supports the view that technological pro-
gress is the chief source of consumer welfare. 20 4 According to this
view, the benefit of these advancements to consumer welfare in the
long run outweighs any allocative losses that consumers might suf-
fer because of monopolistic output restrictions. As Professor Scher-
er has stated,
Making the best use of resources at any moment in time is important. But in
the long run, it is dynamic performance that counts.. . . [A]n output handi-
cap amounting to 10 percent of gross national product owing to static ineffi-
ciency is surmounted in just five years if the output growth rate can be raised
through more rapid technological progress from 3 to 5 percent per annum, or
in 20 years if the growth rate can be increased from 3 to 3.5 percent. 05
In sum, the courts have been reluctant to restrain innovation-
related activity even though it may sometimes have predatory ef-
fects. The reasons for this judicial hesitancy stem from policy and
practical considerations, as well as from economic theory. 08 In
general, predatory innovation issues have received relatively little
empirical or theoretical analysis from either courts or commenta-
tors.207 Nevertheless, beyond judicial reluctance to interfere with
203. Id. at 439 (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d
1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976)). But see notes 215-20 infra and accompanying text, discussing
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal dock-
eted, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980), which suggested a somewhat broader inquiry on
this point.
204. For perhaps the most famous exposition of this view, see J. SCHUMPETER, CAPI-
TALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3d ed. 1950). See also F. SCHERER, supra note 18,
at 407-38.
205. F. SCHERER, supra note 18, at 407. See also Markham, Concentration: A Stimu-
lus or Retardant to Innovation?, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 247 (H.
Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974). Judge Schnacke in Transamerica also noted
the relevance of this principle:
This is not the story of a stagnant, dominated industry. There is no doubt that the
pace of technological progress in the computer industry is extraordinary. Commenta-
tors are fond of saying that had the auto industry kept the same pace over the last 30
years, a Rolls-Royce would cost $2.50 today and would have an EPA gas rating of
2,000,000 miles per gallon.
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 982 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
206. Courts may also be aware of the current, widely held concern that the United
States may be losing its position as the world's technology leader. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION (1979).
207. See Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence in ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 205; Ordover & Willig, supra note 40, at 301. Of all the recent
commentary by academicians, the Ordover/Willig paper is the only contribution to propose
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innovation generally, significant trends concerning various aspects
of the innovation process are discernible. The following subsections
examine these trends as they have developed in cases presenting
design change, predisclosure, and patent accumulation issues.
1. Design Change
Courts that have faced the issue agree in principle that a
dominant firm in one market can alter the design of its product
and thereby obtain an advantage in the markets for necessarily
compatible goods. These courts, moreover, perceive a difference
between genuine product improvements and design changes that
are purely for the purpose of predation. The question is whether
this theoretical distinction can be applied in practice. The opinions
suggest several possible criteria or tests for differentiating between
procompetitive and anticompetitive design changes.
As the Second Circuit in Berkey indicated, "the reaction of
the market" has been an elementary starting point for measuring a
product's quality208 and, by inference, the genuineness of a product
improvement. The Berkey court, however, also hinted that a mar-
ket test alone sometimes may be inadequate to determine the le-
gality of a defendant's design change when that defendant exer-
cises substantial market power in the line of products under
scrutiny and, therefore, can manipulate "the reaction of the mar-
ket." In a unanimous decision Judge Kaufman stated that "[i]f a
monopolist's products gain acceptance in the market, . . . it is of
no importance that a judge or jury may later regard them as infer-
ior, so long as that success was not based on any form of coer-
cion.' ' 20 9 Two years later, Judge Kaufman in Northeastern Tele-
phone relied upon this "coercion" qualification to hold that the
jury should decide whether AT&T had designed certain products
to make interconnection with plaintiff manufacturer's telephone
equipment exceedingly difficult. The court granted a new trial on
the product design issue because of the pervasiveness of the defen-
dant's market domination and stated that
comprehensive tests-beyond according per se legality to all product design and introduc-
tion decisions-for assessing the predatory potential of innovation-related activity.
208. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See also notes 146-47 supra and accompanying text. Sales
data for the product in question and testimony of major users-particularly for goods other
than mass-distribution consumer products-would serve as two indices of the market's
reaction.
209. 603 F.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
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[iln other circumstances, we might be reluctant to allow a jury to second-
guess engineers' decisions as to the proper construction of a sophisticated
piece of equipment. But in this case we cannot look to the reaction of the
competitive market to determine whether one design is superior to another,
compare Berkey, supra, 603 F.2d at 287. As noted previously, ATT's post-
Carterfone tariffs gave it the exclusive right to provide protective couplers.
Market forces cannot operate under such circumstances. Thus, we see no al-
ternative to entrusting the matter of coupler design to the judgment of the
jury.
210
Thus, even if the market "accepts" a defendant's design change, a
showing that the defendant exercises coercive, exclusive control
over that market may warrant the use of further evaluative tech-
niques. Specifically, a court in this situation might refer the case to
the jury for a determination on the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's innovation-related activity.211
A second method that courts have used, albeit cautiously, for
evaluating design changes is to weigh a given design's technical
strengths and weaknesses. Courts have taken at least two different
approaches to making such an evaluation, the more deferential of
which is exemplified by the Northern District of California's deci-
sion in Memorex.2 12 In that case the trial court held that a design
change is lawful as long as a good faith engineering dispute exists
over whether the innovation had a legitimate aim. In response to
Memorex' claim that IBM should have designed one of its com-
puters in a manner that provided greater compatibility with
Memorex' peripheral equipment, the court found that plaintiff's
proof showed merely that alternatives existed to IBM's design
choice. Judge Conti stated that "[when] the approach chosen was
at least as justifiable as the alternative, courts should not get
210. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 95 n.29 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
211. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The
court in GAF applied this principle in reviewing Kodak's motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff's claim that Kodak had manipulated the design of its products to advance its domi-
nant position in the film market. The court ruled that a jury could evaluate the reasonable-
ness of Kodak's design behavior if it first "found coercive conduct by the monopolist or
coercive use of the firm's monopoly power." Id. at 1228. Restating the holdings of Berkey
and Northeastern Telephone the court said,
[Tihe "reasonableness" of the design of a monopolist's new products ... may be scru-
tinized under § 2 in cases in which "market forces cannot operate"--that is, in cases in
which a single firm controls the entire market or in which a monopolist engages in
coercive conduct to affect consumer choice.
Id. (quoting Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 95 n.29 (2d Cir. 1981)).
212. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. (Memorex) v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), affd per curiam sub nom., Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3126 (1981); see notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text.
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involved in second guessing engineers." 213 Thus, under the Memo-
rex test, a defendant can satisfy its burden of proof by introducing
evidence that shows a technical purpose beyond merely frustrating
suppliers of compatible goods, or which indicates in some rough
sense that the chosen design represented a plausible engineering
decision despite the availability of arguably superior designs.2 1
A year after Memorex was decided, the same court in Tran-
samerica21 5 proposed a second, somewhat broader standard for
evaluating the technical strengths and weaknesses of design
changes. Judge Schnacke in Trtnsamerica specifically rejected the
Memorex approach as "overprotective 2 1 6 of innovation and
adopted a test that required the balancing of a variety of relevant
factors, which he outlined as follows:
If the design choice is unreasonably restrictive of competition, the monopo-
list's conduct violates the Sherman Act. This standard will allow the
factfinder to consider the effects of the design on competitors; the effects of
the design on consumers; the degree to which the design was the product of
desirable technological creativity; and the monopolist's intent, since a con-
temporaneous evaluation by the actor should be helpful to the factfinder in
determining the effects of a technological change.
2 17
Although this test potentially is more flexible and less deferential
than the Memorex standard-indeed, it closely resembles a rule of
reason approach-the implication of the court's ultimate holding
was that a product change must lack virtually any redeeming qual-
ities to result in antitrust liability."" The Transamerica court did
213. 458 F. Supp. at 440-41.
214. Every court that has addressed the issue has agreed with the rationale that was
implicit in Memorex: Design changes should not be vulnerable to antitrust attack merely on
the ground that the defendant failed to select the design which was the least restrictive in
terms of competition. See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp.,
613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203,
1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1003
(N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
215. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
216. Id. at 1003. Judge Schnacke interpreted the Memorex standard to suggest "that
where there is a valid engineering dispute over a product's superiority the inquiry should
end." Id.
217. Id. (footnote omitted).
218. The Transamerica court was faced, inter alia, with evaluating some design
changes that the court found IBM had instituted primarily to subdue its competitors, but
which demonstrated some technical advantages over the new product's predecessors and
caused only negligible harm to the corporation's rivals. Finding competitive effect to be
more important than a defendant's intent-particularly under the circumstances before
it-the court declared that IBM's acts were lawful. Id. at 1002-05. In Berkey, however,
Judge Kaufman intimated that a dominant firm's purposeful efforts to create technological
incompatibilities with its own products may itself warrant close scrutiny. Berkey Photo, Inc.
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find that in one instance IBM clearly had degraded the capacity
and quality of a component solely to render its central processing
units incompatible with its rivals' peripheral equipment. 19 The
court, however, failed to hold that this act constituted either mo-
nopolization or an attempt to monopolize. According to the court,
if IBM had exercised monopoly power in either of these markets,
which in Judge Schnacke's view it did not, then the conduct would
have resulted in liability for monopolization2 20 Similarly, the court
did not consider this conduct sufficiently predatory to constitute
an attempt to monopolize-presumably because the court did not
believe that degrading the capacity and quality of a component,
without more, would create a dangerous probability of attaining
monopoly power in the market.
Despite the deference that courts traditionally have given to
dominant firms' design choices, the Second Circuit's recent deci-
sion in Northeastern Telephone2"' suggests at least one significant
limitation on these firms' discretion in this type of innovation-re-
lated activity. Plaintiff in Northeastern Telephone challenged sev-
eral practices by SNET-a Bell System Connecticut affiliate-that
purportedly were intended to exclude it from the market for busi-
ness telephone equipment.222 Specifically, Northeastern claimed
that SNET intentionally had overdesigned "protective
couplers"-which a Bell System tariff required Northeastern's cus-
tomers to use on their telephone equipment from 1969 to the mid-
1970sI21sSo that they would be expensive to purchase and main-
tain. This high cost in turn would have the intended effect of di-
minishing the attractiveness of Northeastern's equipment vis-a-vis
the equipment that the Bell System produced and sold.2
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 283 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
219. 481 F. Supp. at 1004-05.
220. Id. at 1010.
221. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
222. In its 1968 Carterfone decision the Federal Communications Commission invali-
dated an existing AT&T ban on the interconnection of customer-owned terminal equipment
to the Bell network. In re Use of Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, reconsideration de-
nied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). Northeastern was one of many companies that responded to
the Carterfone ruling by entering the telephone equipment market, which Bell previously
had occupied virtually alone.
223. The couplers' stated purpose was to protect the Bell network from problems that
might arise as a result of the interconnection of technically incompatible or flawed equip-
ment. See 651 F.2d at 81.
224. See id. Northeastern claimed that the couplers were incompatible with its equip-
ment and required an external power source. Id.
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Although the Second Circuit flatly rejected all Northeastern's
other claims of predatory conduct, it remanded the case for a new
trial on the interconnection issues. The court expressed no view on
the ultimate merits of Northeastern's allegations, but it did state
that plaintiff's claim against SNET for "intentionally design[ing]
the protective coupler in an unreasonable manner is not totally un-
substantiated. 22 5 The court noted that at the initial trial, North-
eastern had introduced a study which the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) had conducted for the Federal Communications
Commission. The NAS report recommended that the Commission
register equipment which met certain minimal standards in lieu of
allowing AT&T to insist on the use of the couplers.228 Further-
more, in the court's view certain testimony from a Bell System en-
gineer also supported Northeastern's claim that AT&T intention-
ally had designed its couplers to maximize their cost and
inconvenience for potential users. According to the Second Circuit,
the weight of all this evidence was sufficient to warrant a retrial on
the product design issue.227
Whether the Transamerica and Memorex courts would have
reached the same result under the facts in Northeastern Tele-
phone is unclear. The NAS study called AT&T's coupler an "ade-
quate" solution to the interconnection problem, even though the
report ultimately endorsed the registration system alternative22S
Thus, under the Memorex "valid engineering dispute" test, the
NAS report conceivably might show that the coupler de-
sign-though ambiguous in its purpose and technical quality-was
not unquestionably predatory. On the other hand, the protective
coupler design would be less likely to pass muster under the
Transamerica test because of the evidence of monopolistic intent
and the effects of the design on both competitors and consumers.
Of course, both these suggested conclusions are speculative. Al-
though all three decisions propose general standards for evaluating
225. Id. at 96. The court ordered a new trial because it could not determine whether
the jury had based their finding of liability on claims of predatory conduct that the Second
Circuit subsequently rejected.
226. Id. at 94.
227. Id. at 95. Two federal juries have returned verdicts for plaintiffs on similar inter-
connection issues. See, e.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Co., [1981] ANTITRUST AND TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1019, at A-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T,
[1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969, at A-3 (N.D. Ill. 1981), appeals dock-
eted, Nos. 80-2171 and 80-2288 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 1980 and Sept. 28, 1980).
228. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079).
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design changes, they provide little guidance about how meritorious
a defendant's new design must be, or what relative burdens of
proof either party must bear during the lawsuit.
2. Predisclosure
The reported decisions are unanimous in holding that firms
acting alone have virtually no duty to predisclose anticipated de-
sign changes to their competitors. The leading opinion on this is-
sue is Berkey, in which the Second Circuit rejected Berkey's claim
that Kodak had a duty to disclose certain camera design changes
before their commercial introduction.2 9 Berkey had argued that
such predisclosure was necessary to afford firms competing with
Kodak in satellite markets for compatible goods an adequate op-
portunity to redesign their production and other facilities. The
court, however, expressed fear that a disclosure obligation would
enable rivals of an innovative, dominant firm to forego innovation,
wait, and then take advantage of the dominant firm's research and
development efforts. This possibility would diminish the dominant
firm's incentive to innovate.2s ° Significantly, the court did not rest
its refusal to require disclosure entirely on the importance of pre-
serving incentives to compete, but rather stated that the adminis-
trative difficulty of "discerning workable guidelines" for courts and
businesses to follow in determining when predisclosure would be
procompetitive was an equally important consideration.231 Al-
though some language in the opinion arguably implies that a domi-
nant firm's failure to predisclose its own innovations might be a
matter of antitrust concern in some circumstances, 2 the court did
not specify what conditions-if any-would warrant such a differ-
ent attitude. Irrespective of these possible implications, the court
229. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281, 285 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The courts in Telex, Memorex, CalComp, GAF, and
Transamerica all reached similar-if not identical-results on the facts before them.
230. Id. at 281-82. The court stated, "If a firm that has engaged in the risks and ex-
penses of research and development were required in all circumstances to share with its
rivals the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive would very likely be vitiated." Id. at
281.
231. Id. at 281-83.
232. Id. at 282. The court stated that "[w]ithholding from others advance knowledge
of one's new products. . . ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct." Id. at 281 (em-
phasis added). Other courts also have articulated predisclosure rules in terms that stop
short of giving dominant firms absolute discretion to select predisclosure policies. See GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[O]nly in the rarest
case will a monopolist's failure to disclose technical information concerning its new product
support a claim for treble damages under § 2 of the Sherman Act.").
1982] 123
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based its decision at least in part on the lack of sensible, adminis-
trable standards. The logical inference, therefore, is that the courts
might welcome such standards if they could be developed.
Although firms acting alone may have no predisclosure duty,
they may face liability if they attempt to prevent joint venturers
from making voluntary disclosures in certain circumstances. In
Berkey, for example, the court of appeals affirmed a one million
dollar award for Berkey on the ground that Kodak had violated
section one of the Sherman Act by extracting agreements from Syl-
vania and General Electric that required those two firms to remain
silent about flashcubes they were developing in separate joint ven-
tures with Kodak. 33 The court rejected Kodak's argument that the
claim concerning its joint ventures with Sylvania and General
Electric was identical to Berkey's attack upon Kodak's disclosure
practices for its own cameras and film. Judge Kaufman wrote that
"[t]here is a vast difference. . . between actions legal when taken
by a single firm and those permitted for two or more companies
acting in concert. '23 4 He added that "[w]here a participant's mar-
ket share is large, . . . we believe joint development projects have
sufficient anticompetitive potential to invite inquiry. 23 5
The Berkey court held that joint venture agreements between
a monopolist and firms in complementary markets are not per se
section one violations. Among the factors that the court found rele-
vant in evaluating the agreements' reasonableness were: (1) Ko-
dak's dominance in cameras had given it leverage that it could use
to control the terms of the flashcube's disclosure23 1; (2) Kodak's
technological contributions to the development projects were "ar-
guably minimal"23 7; and (3) the agreements' effect was to keep a
"desirable innovation" off the market for an unnecessarily long
time "solely-to suit Kodak's convenience. 23 8 The Berkey court's
analysis on this issue is not universally accepted; in particular, Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Powell sharply questioned its soundness in
their dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.23 9
233. 603 F.2d at 299-305.
234. Id. at 301.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 302 n.67.
237. Id. at 304.
238. Id. at 302.
239. 444 U.S. 1093, 1094-95 (1980). Justice Rehnquist stated that some of Judge Kauf-
man's observations appeared "little less than bizarre." Id. at 1094. Justice Rehnquist added,
If the Sherman Act requires "predisclosure" by one competitor to another before a new
product can be marketed, I think that the raised eyebrows resulting from such a hold-
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. 3. Patent Accumulation
In 1950 the Supreme Court stated in Automatic Radio Manu-
facturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,240 that "[t]he mere ac-
cumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself
illegal. '241 Recently, two cases have tested the breadth of the Ha-
zeltine doctrine through challenges to Xerox' activities in the plain
paper copier market. In Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp.42
a bankrupt office copier manufacturer claimed that Xerox had ob-
tained and protected its dominant position in the office copier
market by building a patent "barricade" around its innovative, dry
paper technology. The trial court rejected Van Dyk's claim, hold-
ing that Xerox' internal patenting activity could not support a
cause of action for monopolization. 43 The court's rationale for the
decision was based on the lack of an anticompetitive intent or pur-
pose in the adoption and execution of Xerox' patent program. The
court, however, did not indicate how a showing that Xerox' re-
search and development efforts had been "adopted or pursued
with anticompetitive intent or purpose" would have affected its
analysis of the liability question. Instead, the court stressed earlier
in the opinion that Xerox' goal had been to develop a new product,
and that, by virtue of its "foresight" and "willingness to take a
risk," it had succeeded. 4 The court noted that the dominant cor-
poration's accumulation of its own patents was protected conduct
because it was the result of product research and development ef-
forts; it stated that Xerox "could and did no more than lawfully
protect itself against competitor copying of its products and insure
that it would not be blocked from the use of inventions which
might prove useful in the future.
'245
A federal district court in Connecticut engaged in a more ex-
tensive discussion of the patent barricading issue in SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp.24 6 As in Van Dyk, plaintiff accused Xerox of mono-
ing should come from this Court, and not from extrapolations by other federal courts of
the decisions of this Court interpreting the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1095.
240. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
241. Id. at 834.
242. 478 F. Supp. 1268 (D.N.J. 1979), afl'd, 631 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981).
243. Id. at 1300, 1302-03.
244. Id. at 1324.
245. Id.
246. 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), afl'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 102 S. Ct. 85 (1981).
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polizing the dry paper copier market by, inter alia, using its re-
search and development efforts to accumulate patents on all possi-
ble dry paper processes. The jury ultimately found for Xerox on
this claim,247 but the trial court's opinion provides an insightful
discussion of the legal theory on which its charge to the jury
rested. The court explained to the jury that although the Hazel-
tine doctrine normally applied to internally developed patents, "an
exception existed in the case of a company that had acquired mo-
nopoly power in a relevant market. ' 248 The court thus charged the
jury that a company was barred from acquiring new patents on
internally developed innovations if they were "primarily for the
purpose of blocking the development and marketing of competitive
products rather than primarily to protect its own products from
being imitated or blocked by others.
2 49
The SCM court conceded that the case law provided no au-
thority for this exception, but it reasoned that the standard struck
an appropriate, albeit delicate, balance between society's interests
in stimulating innovation by established dominant firms, on the
one hand, and new entrants, on the other.2 50 According to the
court, the only risk to patent law policies that this approach raised
was a "possible inhibition on research investment" because of a
fear that bona fide product development research might later be
"found to have been motivated primarily by a desire to block
[competitive product development]." 51 The court stated that this
potential risk "is a reasonable cost to avoid the substantial market
control that would ensue if a company with monopoly power were
free to continue its dominant position by patenting, for blocking
purposes, alternative methods of competition. ' 252 In a later portion
of the opinion the court also suggested that a judicially imposed
rule limiting relief to prospective, equitable measures could serve
"to achieve the competitive purposes of the antitrust laws ...
247. Id. at 1024.
248. Id. at 1007.
249. Id.
250. Id. The court stated,
While there is no case law authority for this standard, it appears to make a reasonable
accommodation between the policies of the patent and antitrust laws, unless there is to
be no limitation whatsoever on the purposes for which a monopolist can add to its






without undue impairment of the objectives of the patent laws. '253
It added that exposing a defendant to treble damages for internal
research and development activities might severely frustrate the
objectives of the patent laws and unacceptably reduce incentives to
innovate. 54
In affirming the trial court's holdings, the Second Circuit only
briefly addressed the patent barricading issue. It noted that "ordi-
narily there is no limitation on a company's freedom to generate
its own patents. '255 The court of appeals then added that the jury
verdict against SCM on this issue had "laid to rest any suspicion
that Xerox's internal R&D program. . . was driven principally by
anticompetitive animus. 252 As in Van Dyk, however, the Second
Circuit's opinion provided no indication of how it would treat the
issue had the jury found an anticompetitive purpose.
In sum, the treatment of patent accumulation issues in both
the SCM and the Van Dyk cases does not provide a sound basis
for predicting whether an internal research and development pro-
gram that is intended mainly to block entry would be free from
challenge under all circumstances. The SCM opinion correctly pro-
poses that the pertinent factors to be considered in developing any
legal standard for evaluating allegations of patent accumulation
are: (1) The preservation of innovation incentives; (2) the relative
contributions of entrants and incumbent firms to the innovation
process; (3) the availability of procompetitive remedies; and (4) the
predictability of results under the standard. The existing case law,
however, gives little support for the view that the phrase "mere
accumulation of patents 2 57 in the Supreme Court's Hazeltine
formula actually will allow an exception for purely internal patent-
ing activity that is the result of an unambiguously predatory or
exclusionary intent.
4. Summary
The judiciary's treatment of the three specific issues discussed
above permits several conclusions about innovation as predatory
conduct. The case law generally leaves dominant firms relatively
free to conduct innovation-related activities when they are acting
alone. At present, the only real danger to a dominant firm-and
253. Id. at 1013.
254. Id. at 1014.
255. 645 F.2d at 1207 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 1207-08 (citations omitted).
257. See note 240 supra and accompanying text.
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even this danger is remote-is that it will be held liable for a de-
sign change that cannot even colorably be justified as a genuine
improvement, but which is made with demonstrably predatory in-
tent. The courts' rationales for this position are that inexpert in-
tervention might diminish a dominant firm's innovation incentive,
and that no apparent manageable guidelines exist for identifying
genuinely pernicious behavior. These concerns, coupled with the
high value that judges attach to innovation generally, have led
courts to devote relatively little attention to the frequency with
which dominant firms arguably use innovation strategies for prin-
cipally predatory ends. This pattern is in contrast to the recent
judicial treatment of pricing behavior, in which courts increasingly
view the potential frequency of predatory pricing as a guide to se-
lecting a legal standard.
Beyond these broad trends, the innovation cases contain two
other common features that could be useful in predicting future
legal developments. First, all the cases discussed above deal with
high technology industries that the courts are likely to view favora-
bly. The defendant in each case enjoyed a reputation either as an
industry founder, such as Xerox, or as a technologically progressive
leader whose work has been essential to modern growth in its par-
ticular field, namely, both IBM and Kodak. Courts may be less
prone to apply these lenient tests in certain consumer goods indus-
tries, for example, in which the innovations at issue usually result
more from product differentiation efforts based only on modest
quality gains than from startling process or product quality ad-
vances. Second, those defendants whose activities have sparked
some degree of judicial disapproval-for example, Kodak on the
joint venture issue and AT&T on the coupler issue-actually hin-
dered rather than aided the flow of new products to the market.
Although current law allows dominant firms wide latitude in inno-
vation-related activity, these companies are more likely to risk lia-
bility if their activities cast them as defenders of outdated prod-
ucts rather than as risk-taking innovators. Similarly, if plaintiffs
can convince the court that they represent either a fresh source of
innovative ideas, or, in Scherer's words, a remedy for the "techno-
logical arteriosclerosis" that sometimes accompanies the long-term
domination of an industry by a small, fixed set of incumbents,5 8
then their chances of prevailing on the merits likely will
258. Scherer, Comments on "Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence," in






Despite the tremendous effort to distinguish predatory con-
duct generally from legitimate, competitive behavior, the status of
promotion as a predatory device remains relatively unclear. Very
few predatory promotion cases have proceeded to a final judgment
on the merits. One reason is that the nature and variety of promo-
tional activities make legal analysis particularly difficult. Indeed,
much of the critical economic learning needed to inform this legal
analysis is not yet far beyond the issue-framing stage. The case law
reflects this insubstantial foundation, since courts generally have
proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Accordingly, before examining the
cases for those standards and trends that may be discerned, it will
be helpful to review briefly some of the key issues and controver-
sies that underlie, and will continue to influence, most predatory
promotion claims.
Although sometimes treated analytically as a species of preda-
tory pricing, predatory promotion allegations present issues and
problems that typically do not arise in predatory pricing claims.
Initially, even identifying and distinguishing among the many dif-
ferent types of promotional activity can be problematical. Ques-
tions arise, for example, about whether advertising, as opposed to
promotional pricing or long-term investment in goodwill, should
include activity such as contests, coupons, discounts to distributors
in return for shelf space preferences, and sponsorship of public tel-
evision programs.
Advertising's special qualitative elements, which are reflected
259. One possible theoretical basis on which plaintiffs might seek to develop the argu-
ments that are outlined in this paragraph is the considerable academic literature that places
a heavy emphasis on the contribution which entrants make to society as sources of innova-
tion. Students of innovation stress the importance of entrants both as developers of new
goods and processes and as sources of refinement and improvement for existing products.
Scherer summarizes this view as follows:
There is abundant evidence from case studies to support the view that actual and
potential new entrants play a crucial role in stimulating technical progress, both as
direct sources of innovation and as spurs to existing industry members. Established
producers often develop physical and psychological commitments to the customary way
of doing things. Because they lack such commitments, new entrants contribute a dis-
proportionately high share of all really revolutionary new industrial products and
processes.
F. SCHERER, supra note 18, at 437-38.
260. The authors are particularly grateful to John B. Kirkwood and David P. Frankel
for their contributions to this section of the Article.
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in its content, timing, and target audiences, present problems that
distinguish it from pricing as a potential tool for predation. Assess-
ing the competitive significance of these elements is largely a mat-
ter of interpretation that resists systematic analysis. In addition,
the variety of subtle yet substantial effects that promotion may
have in different situations greatly complicates the tasks of identi-
fying any underlying predatory intent and of tracing any anticom-
petitive impact.
Another distinction between promotion and pricing predation
arises because advertising has both short- and long-term attrib-
utes. Particularly if a cost-based test is applied to promotional ac-
tivity, some determination must be made about whether advertis-
ing costs, which are often substantial, should be expensed or
capitalized. This allocation problem must be faced directly when
using a standard that focuses on short-term marginal cost. By con-
trast, a long-term, total cost rule generally will permit greater flex-
ibility on this question, since it likely would encompass all adver-
tising costs except those for activity whose effects decay
particularly slowly.
2 61
Additional allocation issues arise if the promotion is restricted
to a localized area such as a test market. If the alleged predator
uses a mix of national, regional, and local advertising campaigns, it
may be necessary, particularly under cost-based rules, to apportion
the advertising expenditures among geographic regions to deter-
mine how much of any increase reflects the incumbent's response
to entry in the relevant geographic market. This measurement, like
the decay rate computation, is difficult to perform reliably without
substantial expertise and sound judgment. Both, however, are cru-
cial to ascertaining the incumbent's overall costs and the magni-
tude of any allegedly predatory shifts in advertising.
26 2
Because of these differences between predatory promotion and
predatory pricing, promotion claims cannot be resolved effectively
261. Professor Scherer, however, has suggested that, as a general rule, advertising ef-
fects decay fairly rapidly. F. SCHERER, supra note 18, at 286 (citihg Clarke, Econometric
Measurement of the Duration of Advertising Effect on Sales, 13 J. MARKETING RESEARCH
345 (1976)). Nevertheless, before making this determination, a court in any given case may
want to consider the type of advertising and the firm-specific and industry-specific decay
rates.
262. The need to allocate expenses to the appropriate models or products in a full
product line further complicates the difficulty in apportioning promotional expenditures to
relevant time periods and geographic markets. Of course, some analogous apportionment
and measurement problems also arise in the treatment of pricing claims. See notes 150-53
supra and accompanying text.
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by applying the cost-based rules discussed in the subsection on
pricing."" Furthermore, the need for an independent promotion
analysis is likely to increase, since, as some respected commenta-
tors have argued, promotion in some instances may be a more cost-
effective predatory instrument than pricing.26 At least seven, po-
tentially interrelated factors provide support for this proposition.
First, a dominant firm may enjoy economies of scale or experience
in advertising that give it a relative advantage over a new entrant,
while price cutting over a large-unit volume might work to the in-
cumbent's disadvantage.8 5 Second, in addition to their short-term
impact, advertising and promotion have certain fixed-cost, invest-
ment-like attributes. These qualities, which may provide long-term
advantages to the dominant firm over and above any predatory
benefits resulting from the behavior, include increased product dif-
ferentiation, expanded market penetration, and broader consumer
acceptance. Although price cuts may have some promotional as-
pects, across-the-board price reductions that are withdrawn after
they have served their purpose probably do not create the longer
term promotional benefits of an equivalent amount of advertising.
Third, Professor Porter and others assert that an entrant
"must match [the dominant firm] in absolute message volume to
remain [at parity]. 2 66 If so, a dominant firm may choose to in-
crease its promotional intensity in response to entry, knowing that
it can apportion its increases across a much larger product volume
base than can its rival.2 67 Fourth, advertising experience and prod-
263. See notes 133-88 supra and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., Porter, Strategic Interaction: Some Lessons from Industry Histories for
Theory and Antitrust Policy, in ANTrrRUST ANAL YsIs, supra note 31, at 479-80. Because a
pricing response may often be less cost-effective than another response, Porter concludes
that "the form of competitive behavior often attacked in antitrust investigations of preda-
tory aggressive price cutting may be the most benign in terms of the exercise of market
power." Id. at 480.
265. See, e.g., note 18 supra and accompanying text. For example, an eight percent
advertising increase by a dominant firm enjoying scale or other economies in promotion may
force a new entrant to increase its advertising by, perhaps, ten percent just to maintain
parity. This situation may reflect desirable advertising efficiencies, or it may be a function of
the established firm's already entrenched position in the market. In either event, these econ-
omies are not likely to be as readily available in the implementation of pricing strategies;
the dominant firm employing a predatory pricing scheme typically will be able to induce an
entrant to drop its prices only to the extent that the dominant firm itself is willing to under-
take a proportionately equal price reduction.
266. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 264, at 500 fig. 2.
267. With this strategy, an incumbent can cause its rival to suffer a disproportionately




uct identification may offer incumbent firms certain tactical ad-
vantages over newcomers. The dominant firm can tailor its adver-
tising campaign specifically either to highlight the existence or
nonexistence of significant differences between the entrant's prod-
uct and its own or to distract attention from the entrant's product
entirely. A newcomer, however, may have to conduct a less focused
campaign that stresses a broader array of product or service quali-
ties in order to build a viable base of customer and market accept-
ance. This potential tactical advantage is particularly strong in test
markets, in which a product's success may determine whether an
entrant will attempt a broad market challenge to the dominant
firm. In this situation a dominant firm might increase drastically
its advertising expenditures for an existing product in an attempt
to invalidate or distort a rival's test marketing efforts and results.
This increase also may signal an intention to respond aggressively
to any extended market challenge. Similarly, a dominant firm
might heavily promote a "fighting brand," not principally in re-
sponse to consumer demand, but "as shock troops to absorb the
brunt of a competitive attack.
268
Fifth, promotional campaigns may be better customized than
pricing strategies to fit the individual characteristics of particular
demographic, geographic, and product markets. In particular, a
dominant firm may focus its most intense promotional efforts on
the most critical markets and market segments, without any con-
cern of violating the Robinson-Patman Act, since that Act deals
only with price discrimination and not cost discrimination. Sixth,
advertising may be a more efficient predatory tactic than price cut-
ting because it avoids the problem of distributors, intermediate
wholesalers, and retailers not passing on the benefits of a dominant
firm's price reductions. Thus, advertising allows a more direct rela-
tionship with the consumer. It may be initiated, pursued for a
while, and then abruptly discontinued. Moreover, all these options
typically are within the incumbent's exclusive control. Last, the
antitrust case law is far more developed in the area of predatory
pricing than in predatory advertising. Accordingly, a pricing re-
268. M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 85 (1980). The fighting brand can "run inter-
ference" for the predator's main product by temporarily crowding the available product
space, confusing consumers, or otherwise creating "noise" in the test market. The entrant
consequently may find either that its expected return has diminished or that the risks of its
venture have increased to the point that exit from the market is necessary or planned ex-
pansion is infeasible. See Howard, Fighting It Out in the Test Market, DuN's REv., June
1979, at 69; Salop, supra note 31, at 1-42.
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sponse to entry may entail a greater risk of legal action by the en-
trant or government enforcement agencies. 69
Notwithstanding all these apparent advantages of promotional
predation over pricing predation, several arguments support the
contrary proposition that dominant firms will not engage in preda-
tory advertising;270 even these contentions, however, are subject to
countervailing considerations. First, promotion arguably does not
have any anticompetitive effects, since an entrant conceivably can
negate any attempts at predation with its own advertising. On the
other hand, an established firm in many cases may be better able
than a new entrant to bear the burdens of an advertising war be-
cause of its generally stronger financial position. Even an entrant
with equal access to capital and, thus, no cash flow or risk pre-
mium problems typically would have trouble overcoming the in-
cumbent's credibility and advertising effectiveness per dollar. Nev-
ertheless, the very novelty of the entrant's presence may make
consumers more willing to make experimental purchases of a new
product.271 If so, the entrant may benefit from a temporary, recep-
tive attitude that enhances its advertising effectiveness.
Second, predatory advertising theoretically should fail if it
does not respond to real consumer needs. As many firms have dis-
covered to their detriment, aggressive promotion alone cannot cre-
ate a market for an otherwise unwanted product. Thus, according
to this analysis, a product's success is based not on the predatory
character of its promotion, but on how consumers perceive its ben-
efits. This argument, however, assumes that purchasers are per-
fectly aware of all that benefits them. Effects of an incumbent's
actions that appear beneficial in the short term often may injure
consumers in the long run. Indeed, this principle is the very es-
sence of predation. An established firm may find it well worth the
cost to respond to real but short-term consumer needs if such a
scheme can eliminate an entrant, deter future market challenges,
and give the firm durable market power. Under these circum-
stances, the opportunity for long-term consumer choice may be
269. Of course, both promotion and pricing are subject to myriad local, state, federal,
and industry-imposed constraints, many of which are independent of the antitrust laws.
270. If predation is not profitable for a dominant firm in a particular case, then argua-
bly the firm will not attempt it. Firms, however, do not always evaluate their self-interest
correctly. Thus, a contention that predation did not occur because it would not have been
remunerative should not be dispositive of all claims of predatory behavior.
271. See Lawrence, How to Test Advertising, MANAGEMENT TODAY, May 1968, at 86.
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lost before consumers have a chance fully to assess their options. 72
A final argument supporting the proposition that dominant
firms will not engage in predatory advertising is that incumbents
cannot make a substantial investment in advertising and then at-
tempt to recoup their costs without ultimately charging monopoly
prices, which would invite either additional entry or reentry 73
This argument has merit in those situations in which entry barriers
are low and serious potential competitors are waiting in the wings.
On the other hand, if entry is difficult, or if potential competitors
are scarce, a dominant firm can profitably engage in predatory ad-
vertising to rebuff a rival who attempts to mount a serious market
challenge. When the successful incumbent subsequently raises its
prices to recoup its advertising costs, few firms will be able to take
advantage of the opportunity to enter the market. Moreover, the
initial challenger's experience may serve to discourage further any
new entry.
In sum, it is at least arguable, although certainly not a matter
of consensus among commentators, that advertising and other
forms of promotion may be profitable predation devices. 4 Never-
272. In many circumstances, it will be important to the manufacturer and valuable to
the purchaser for a retailer to make available to the consumer certain services and informa-
tion as well as to sell him the product. Classic examples arise in the markets for luxury or
highly technical consumer goods when the manufacturer needs the retailer to maintain its
product's image or to educate the consumer. The retailer, of course, can do this by main-
taining an attractive store and employing knowledgeable sales personnel, but not without
cost. In these circumstances, retailers who do not provide similar amenities and can, there-
fore, charge lower prices than the full-service dealers, are said to be "free riding." Professor
Posner points out that "free rider" problems substantially reduce the possibility that con-
sumers will organize to protect themselves from exploitation, especially if the product in
question has a large number of purchasers. R. PosNER, supra note 24, at 184-85.
273. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 13, at 314-20 (1978); R. PosNaR, supra note 24, at
92-93; Demsetz, supra note 24, at 164, 173-74; Easterbrook, supra note 18. This argument
echoes the analysis that some of these same commentators make in evaluating the profit-
ability of the traditional concept of deep-pocket predation. See note 18 supra and accompa-
nying text.
274. Although only the recent cases are reviewed below, courts traditionally have rec-
ognized the possibility of predatory promotion. The Supreme Court first expressly discussed
predatory advertising in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946): "Such
tremendous advertising, however, is also a widely published warning that these companies
possess and know how to use a powerful offensive and defensive weapon against new com-
petition. New competition dare not enter such a field, unless it be well supported by compa-
rable national advertising." Id. at 797 (emphasis added). In 1968 a court and jury held
Chrysler Corporation liable for attempted monopolization that was based on price cutting
and "massive" advertising. Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). Six years later, in an analo-
gous case, the Third Circuit found insufficient evidence for manufacturer's liability, but ac-
knowledged the validity of the Mt. Lebanon decision. Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577,
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theless, whether legal recourse should be available to restrain these
activities is an entirely different question. By protecting an en-
trant, courts risk meddling in the operation of a proven enterprise
in order to shelter a firm that otherwise may be too inefficient to
compete on its own. Moreover, assuming that some intervention is
desirable, it remains exceedingly difficult to fashion a standard for
evaluating predatory promotion that is sufficiently broad in scope,
that is not easily circumvented, and that does not inject anticom-
petitive distortions of its own into the market. Thus, courts that
are presented with allegations of predatory promotion not only
must face the usual difficulties of evaluating and interpreting the
conduct at issue, but they also must address the threshold, com-
plex policy questions of how to respond to that conduct.
In the few recent cases that have dealt with predatory adver-
tising or promotion, the promotion allegations usually have been
supplemental to claims of predatory pricing or innovation.27 5 Al-
though distinct trends are difficult to identify with any certainty in
this small class of cases, the courts appear to have decided most of
these claims on an ad hoc "rule of reason" basis. In Buffalo Cou-
rier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc.,27 6 for example,
the publisher of Buffalo's morning newspaper, the Courier-Ex-
press, sued the publisher of the city's evening newspaper, the Eve-
ning News, claiming that the latter was about to promote its new
Sunday edition predatorily. The challenged conduct consisted pri-
marily of the Evening News' announcement that each of its sub-
scribers would receive a Sunday paper at no additional charge for
five consecutive weeks. At the end of this period, anyone wishing a
Sunday Evening News could continue to receive it for only thirty
cents per week above the regular subscription rate for weekdays
and Saturdays.
The district court in Buffalo Courier-Express preliminarily
590 (3d Cir. 1974). The authors are indebted to Ross Petty for this point. See also FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Bailey's Bakery,
Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1086 (1969).
275. Even though the courts apparently did not attach legal significance to their state-
ments, many early predation decisions noted that large increases in advertising accompanied
predatory pricing. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1961); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160
(1911); Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237 (2d
Cir. 1929); Gerber Prods. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916, 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); In re Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 163, 166-67 (1971).
276. 441 F. Supp. 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), vacated, 601 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1979).
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enjoined this free sampling campaign for any period that was
longer than two weeks. 77 The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, however, vacated the injunction and held not only that the
Courier-Express had failed to introduce proof that sampling in ex-
cess of two weeks was unusual, but also-and perhaps more impor-
tant-that "there was no sufficient evidence that the five week
sampling would produce even a short-term loss for the News' oper-
ations taken as a whole. 2 78 According to the court, therefore,
plaintiff had not shown that the Evening News had violated any of
the cost-based predation standards. 79
The Second Circuit's holding in Buffalo Courier-Express intu-
itively appears reasonable. Even if the Evening News had intended
predatorily to usurp its rival's customers, the Courier-Express, in
the spirit of vigorous competition, easily could have prepared for
the well-publicized sampling period. The two factors that made
predation unlikely in Buffalo Courier-Express were that the Eve-
ning News announced its promotion campaign in advance of imple-
menting it, and that the promotion was to last for only a short
period. Indeed, the Second Circuit expressly noted that had the
Evening News offered free copies to subscribers for ten weeks, the
district court could have held, even without evidence that the sam-
pling produced a short-term loss, that the publisher had gone too
far.280
Another Second Circuit case, which was issued soon after Buf-
falo Courier-Express, provides further clarification of the permissi-
277. Id. at 646.
278. 601 F.2d at 55 (citing Areeda & Turner, supra note 6, at 728-30). Indeed, the
Evening News cited two similar instances in which newspapers had offered a free sampling
for four-week periods upon introducing a new Sunday edition.
279. Id. at 57-58. Consequently, the court held that the Courier-Express had failed to
demonstrate either a probable success on the merits or any sufficiently serious questions
reaching the merits to provide a fair ground for litigation and tip the "balance of hardships"
in its favor.
280. Id. at 55. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck
Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1974), which was issued shortly before the publication of
the Areeda and Turner article, provides an instructive counterpart to Buffalo Courier-Ex-
press. In Morning Pioneer the larger of two newspapers, the Bismarck Tribune, conducted a
lengthy and extensive free sampling campaign in the geographic area that its potential rival,
the Morning Pioneer, dominated. In affirming the district court's holding for plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that "[tihe blanketing condemned by the
court clearly exceeded that permissible in furtherance of a legitimate attempt by the Trib-
une to enter [Morning Pioneer's] market and properly served as a basis for the court's im-
plicit finding of an intent to monopolize by the Tribune." Id. at 387. Thus, the magnitude of
a promotional sampling campaign may mark the difference between a legitimate market
entry effort and an unlawful attempt to monopolize.
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ble scope of a dominant firm's promotional efforts. In addition to
addressing the claims of predatory innovation that were discussed
above, 81 the court of appeals in Berkey faced an allegation that
Kodak had monopolized or attempted to monopolize a camera and
film submarket. 82 Berkey contended that Kodak had committed
predation by introducing a new film, Kodacolor II, that was com-
patible only with defendant's new camera, the Pocket Instamatic.
Berkey also claimed that Kodak had excessively "puffed" the tech-
nical merits of the new film to depress the sales of plaintiff's older
format cameras. The Second Circuit rejected the predatory adver-
tising claim, holding that "in its advertising, a producer is ordina-
rily permitted, much like an advocate at law, to bathe his cause in
the best light possible.2 83 As the Supreme Court had done previ-
ously, 284 however, the Second Circuit acknowledged the possibility
that advertising could create entry barriers leading to a violation of
section two of the Sherman Act.28 5 Nevertheless, this case illus-
trates not only the strategic use of promotion by a dominant firm
against a marginal rival, but also how promotion may be combined
with other conduct-in this case new product introduction-to
maximize the competitive impact of both.
In contrast to the Buffalo Courier-Express and Berkey deci-
sions, a recent Ninth Circuit case held that a dominant firm may
violate the Sherman Act by engaging in various nonprice promo-
tional activities. In Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods,
Inc.28 Hunt entered into the spaghetti sauce market by offering a
novel "Extra Thick and Zesty" product. Ragu, the dominant firm,
responded to Hunt's entry with tactics that, Hunt alleged, violated
the Sherman Act by: (1) Granting price reductions in Hunt's test
market areas; (2) announcing plans to market its own "Extra
Thick and Zesty" product shortly before Hunt was scheduled to
281. See notes 189-259 supra and accompanying text.
282. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
283. Id. at 287 (footnote omitted).
284. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). In this case the Court
held that Procter & Gamble's product extension acquisition of Clorox violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act, in part because the acquisition tended to raise barriers to a new entrant who
"would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it would have been to face
the smaller Clorox." Id. at 579. See also Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881,
889-90 (9th Cir. 1979).
285. The court stated that "[a] monopolist is not forbidden to publicize its product
unless the extent of this activity is so unwarranted by competitive exigencies as to consti-
tute an entry barrier." 603 F.2d at 287.
286. 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980).
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begin its national promotion; (3) appropriating the phrase "thick
and zesty," which impeded consumer identification of that phrase
with Hunt's product; (4) copying a figure that was used in each of
Hunt's advertising layouts-a spoon pouring sauce over spa-
ghetti-for use in a Ragu national advertisement; and (5) labeling
the Ragu sauce to conceal that it actually was thickened by starch,
rather than by long simmering.287 In sum, Hunt alleged that Ragu
was guilty of predation both in its pricing and in the timing and
content of its promotional activities.
In granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court
held that Ragu's nonpricing activity, even if proved, would not vio-
late the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, disagreed and held that
the question presented here is whether any market could exist, consistent
with the allegations of Hunt's complaint, in which Ragu's non-price related
activities could have contributed to an anticompetitive effect. Assuming the
existence of some market power, Ragu's conduct could have made Hunt's en-
try into the market more difficult and costly, to the detriment of competition
generally. 28
8
The court then remanded the case for a determination on the mer-
its of the nonprice predation claims. 8 9
Several conclusions can be drawn from these predatory adver-
tising and promotional decisions. First, since pure advertising or
promotion cases are rare, attorneys for dominant firms can distin-
guish the legal authority that appears to support predatory adver-
tising claims rather easily by emphasizing the nonpromotional as-
pects of that authority. Second, because many courts have
discussed advertising or promotion as only a secondary issue or an
afterthought, their discussions have tended to lack the force and
depth of analysis found in the treatment of other predation issues.
Last, the decisions have tended to place an even higher burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff in predatory advertising or promotion
cases than in pure predatory pricing cases. This trend may have
developed in part because of the inherent difficulties in identifying
and distinguishing between competitive and predatory promotional
activity. While this distinction is hard to draw in pure pricing
cases under the cost-based, bright-line standards, the task is even
more formidable when promotional and other nonpricing factors
are included in the calculus. Nonetheless, the predatory advertis-
287. Id. at 923.
288. Id. at 927.
289. Id. at 929.
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ing and promotion cases generally have recognized, albeit in dic-
tum, that nonpricing activity can be an instrument of unlawful
predation. Indeed, no decision has suggested that advertising or
promotion cannot or should not be declared predatory under the
proper circumstances.
Courts have gone little further than making this acknowledg-
ment, however, and the threshold of proof is high. Perhaps Berkey
best articulated the prevailing standard when it stated that to be
unlawful, promotional activity must be "so unwarranted by com-
petitive exigencies as to constitute an entry barrier."290 This gen-
eral test graphically demonstrates the uncertain status of advertis-
ing and promotion, for it no more than reformulates the pivotal
legal-and theoretical-question in any predation analysis: What
dominant firm conduct that is detrimental to actual and potential
rivals nonetheless is warranted by "competitive exigencies?"29 1 For
additional guidance, therefore, one must look, at least for the pres-
ent, beyond the province of federal antitrust doctrine to the vari-
ous private and public regulatory programs, including state and
common-law unfair competition principles, industry self-regulation
standards, and consumer protection regulation, when applicable.
IV. PATTERNS
The field of predation provides a classic example of how the
interplay of scholarly debate and judicial decisionmaking can fur-
nish a foundation for the courts to transform economic proposals
into legal norms. Not surprisingly, therefore, the courts' treatment
of predation issues can be divided into three broad categories that
parallel the series of compound questions around which the cur-
rent academic debate revolves. 29 1 These categories, which are dis-
cussed seriatim below, are: (1) The frequency with which the truly
objectionable conduct may be expected to occur; (2) the likelihood
that either the objectionable conduct or the efforts to proscribe it
290. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
797 (1946)). Judge Kaufman, who was the author of the Berkey opinion, recently reiterated
this view in Northeastern Telephone. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 93
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission in Borden found that Borden's ReaLemon trademark was so well
established and highly promoted that it constituted an entry barrier. In re Borden, Inc.,
(ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669, 791 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
1979).
291. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
292. See notes 19-64 supra and accompanying text.
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will have significant anticompetitive or procompetitive effects; and
(3) the extent to which business managers and courts can under-
stand and apply the pertinent legal standard without undue costs
or administrative burdens.93
A. Frequency of Occurrence
The courts disagree as sharply as do the commentators about
how frequently predation occurs. This discord stems in part from
the controversies over the appropriate definition of predation, as
well as over whether entry barriers exist that are sufficient to insu-
late a monopolist from market challenges long enough to enable it
to recoup the cost of its predatory behavior. Thus, both in the
scholarly journals and in the courts, predation remains a concept
of shifting contour and dimension. Despite its elusiveness, how-
ever, courts still must face the issues of the frequency and magni-
tude of predation, since the resolution of these issues often deter-
mines whether courts, as a matter of policy, should ignore alleged
predation, treat it summarily, fashion bright-line rules of conduct,
or subject each alleged instance to the fullest possible scrutiny.
Those judicial opinions that have addressed the issue since
1975 provide some initial indication of how often predation has oc-
curred. The cases selected 94 for examination present a pattern in
which defendants typically have prevailed, 9 5 and thus the logical
inference is that predation is not a frequent or a widespread phe-
nomenon. To draw'a firm conclusion based solely on the results of
reported cases, however, would be a mistake. These statistics alone
cannot account for the number or quality of cases that were set-
293. See Kirkwood, Comments from the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ANTITRUST
L.J. 953 (1980).
294. Fifty-seven cases were selected. They were drawn from those reported opinions
since 1975 in which pricing, innovation, or promotion were major ingredients of the plain-
tiffs monopolization, attempt to monopolize, or price discrimination claims. Those cases in
which judges or litigants concentrated on the predatory or nonpredatory nature of conduct
other than pricing, innovation, and promotion were examined, but they ultimately were ex-
cluded from the analysis in the Article. Also excluded were cases in which the courts' opin-
ions failed to address the substantive standards for evaluating the defendant's pricing, inno-
vation, or promotion conduct. Finally, this analysis excludes those reported decisions in
which the court analyzed predatory pricing allegations under statutes other than the federal
antitrust laws. For a list of the cases selected, see Appendix A.
295. Of the 57 cases selected, nine still await a decision on the merits at the trial stage.
Seven others-all judgments for the defendants-were reversed on appeal and have not yet
been tried again on the merits. Of the remaining 41 cases, plaintiffs have won four at trial,
all of which have been appealed. Defendants have won all 16 final judgments from which no
further appeals are possible. For a classification of these cases, see Appendix B.
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tled, unnecessarily pursued, or never filed. Cases of clear preda-
tion, of course, are very likely to be settled before trial. Moreover,
many of the selected cases were instituted before 1975, and thus
the plaintiffs' decisions to file suit were made without the benefit
of recent theoretical developments. 96 In essence plaintiffs may
have sensed predation, but not known what to look for. As plain-
tiffs become more accustomed to the type and quantum of evi-
dence that they must produce to meet their burdens of proof, de-
fendants may begin to suffer defeat more regularly.
The cases clearly indicate more than an indifferent perception
that predation is occurring. On the other hand, the strong pattern
of outcomes favoring defendants does raise a powerful inference
that true predation is in fact rare.9 7 These recent patterns are es-
pecially striking when contrasted with a previous study by Profes-
sor Koller,29 8 in which he found that in cases decided prior to 1971
the plaintiff was "legally adjudged" to have suffered from preda-
tory pricing behavior in ninety-five cases, whereas the defendants
had won only twenty-eight.29 9 This statistic gives rise to two possi-
ble, though not necessarily conflicting, inferences. First, the cases
decided since 1975 may have been more meritorious than their
outcomes would suggest. Second, the Areeda/Turner standard and
its progeny may have made the applicable predation standards far
tougher on plaintiffs who perceive themselves injured by predatory
296. In addition, a problem exists in assessing the encouraging or discouraging impact
of prior decisions on the size and composition of current cases.
297. The presence of factually similar cases against IBM and AT&T may have inflated
the number of defendants' victories, although several different courts each had the opportu-
nity to apply its own analysis. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-1079); California
Computer Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978);
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., [1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 969,
at A-3 (N.D. Ill.), appeals docketed, Nos. 80-2171 & 80-2288 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 1980 & Sept.
28, 1980) (judgment for plaintiff); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp.
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. (Memorex) v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct, 3126 (1981).
298. Koller, supra note 18.
299. Id. at 110. Altogether, Koller examined 123 predation cases. Defendants won 28,
private plaintiffs won 12, the Justice Department won 8, the FTC prevailed in 25, another
32 resulted in consent decrees, and 18 were decided on procedural issues. Id. at 110-11, 111
n.8. Arguably, however, Koller should have excluded these last two categories from his
computation.
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One change that certainly has occurred since Koller's study,
which would support the second of these inferences, is that the
theoretical concept of a meritorious case has matured. Predation
analysis recently has become more sophisticated, and plaintiffs
now must meet more preconditions to establish a successful claim
than courts previously required. Thus, at least as the courts' opin-
ions have described them, many plaintiffs' cases have been remark-
ably weak. Some plaintiffs, for example, have not attempted to re-
late the defendant's prices to the defendant's costs, which suggests
that the plaintiff's true source of dissatisfaction is that, for
whatever reason, the defendant has been able to undercut him in
the market.301 Some of the plaintiffs who do relate the defendant's
prices to the defendant's costs still fail to demonstrate even that
these prices are lower than the defendant's average total cost.
3 02
Moreover, neither private plaintiffs nor the government, except in
In re Borden, Inc.,"'3 has been able to establish that the predation
occurred in an industry with high entry barriers. Some plaintiffs
also have failed to help the court interpret ambiguous pricing evi-
dence by introducing admissible, independent evidence of the de-
fendant's intent.30 Nevertheless, these possible explanations for
300. This conclusion should be restricted to private plaintiffs. The government
brought only four of the selected cases, which is too small a sample from which to draw any
conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 112 (1976); In re ITT Continental Baking Co., [1981] 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) V 21,823; In re DuPont de Nemours, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,770 (1980); In re
Borden (ReaLemon) 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
1979). In fact, this private plaintiff/government plaintiff breakdown should serve to qualify
any conclusions about the impact of the Areeda/Turner test on general liability standards,
since courts in private plaintiff cases either may have been reluctant to subject a defendant
to treble damages or may have perceived only a weak causal link between the defendant's
conduct and the private plaintiff's alleged injury.
301. See, e.g., Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980);
Americana Indus., Inc. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 556 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1977); Flair
Zipper Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. V 63,555 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
302. See, e.g., Chilicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427
(7th Cir. 1980); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas.
63,947 (S.D. Ohio 1981). Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D.
Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
303. In re Borden, Inc. (ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-
3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1979).
304. See, e.g., Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d
48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1979); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856-60
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352,
1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-
1 Trade Cas. V 62,498, at 76,913 (S.D. Ohio 1979). In some cases courts have ruled that the
plaintiff's offer of proof was inadmissible. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co.,
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the trend in favor of defendants do not entirely explain the dispar-
ity, since even when plaintiffs have demonstrated that the defen-
dant's price is below its average variable cost, the plaintiffs have
lost.30 5
In theory, conclusions about the frequency of predation must
remain tentative so long as the definition of predation remains
subject to continuing controversy and development. In practice the
implications of the post-1975 predation cases on the question of
frequency likewise are ambiguous. While the sheer volume of re-
cent predation cases may tend to belie the Areeda/Turner view
that predation is rare, defendants clearly have enjoyed overwhelm-
ing success in this recent litigation. Very few of these cases have
presented the market structure conditions-particularly high entry
barriers-that economists believe to be necessary for true, welfare-
reducing predation. Before concluding, however, that predation
never occurs, one should remember that in the interval between
the filing and the deciding of these cases, theoretical, economic,
and legal developments changed the "rules of the game." Thus, if
predation had occurred, then proving its existence required a more
complex and less clear-cut analysis than most plaintiffs were pre-
pared to present. Moreover, the current spate of scholarly com-
mentary that criticizes the AreedalTurner position and emphasizes
the strategic aspects of predation suggests that the possibilities of
sophisticated predatory conduct should not yet be ignored.
B. Competitive Dangers
In evaluating the competitive dangers that any challenged ac-
tivity poses, courts must examine not only the harm to competition
that the conduct itself threatens, but also the harm to competition
engendered by judicial attempts to prevent that conduct. The first
component of this examination, the harm stemming from preda-
tion itself, includes both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
While the quantitative aspects are directly related to the frequency
570 F.2d at 853. The court in Janich, however, recognized that direct evidence could be
used to establish the presence of the requisite specific intent. Id.
305. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652
F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems,
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Hawaii 1980); Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd.,
478 F. Supp. 589 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd per curiam, 649 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1981). The
possibility should not be overlooked, of course, that none of the current or prior legal tests
of predation adequately distinguishes true economic predation from competition that en-
hances long-run consumer welfare. If this is so, then no mere analysis of outcomes will shed
light on questions regarding the actual frequency of predation.
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of predatory behavior, the qualitative aspects relate to the magni-
tude and nature of the effects of any given instance of predation.
For this latter issue, the finder of fact and, ex ante, the poli-
cymaker, must resolve and balance several crucial questions, which
include: Whether the conduct rebuffs specific entry challenges, de-
ters entry generally, or both; whether the conduct forces existing
rivals to exit the market, or whether it allows them to persist, al-
beit in a quiescent rather than a competitive mode; whether the
victims of the alleged predation can survive in the long run irre-
spective of the alleged predation; and whether the victim either is
as efficient as the predator or has a short-term prospect of becom-
ing so. The answers to these questions help illuminate the competi-
tive dangers that the incumbent's conduct threatens. Rather than
considering only these rather specific factors, however, courts also
should have at least some idea of which outcomes are more desira-
ble than others from a public policy perspective. For example, en-
gaging in predation against a firm that is not viable in the long
run, or which is less efficient than the incumbent, arguably might
strengthen the economy by promoting a natural, competitive pro-
cess in which only the most efficient firms survive. On the other
hand, even firms that are less efficient than the dominant firm may
perform a useful market function by providing at least some check
on the exploitation of otherwise poorly bridled monopoly power.3 "
In addition, by approaching the market with a different combina-
tion of skills and perspectives than their rivals, these firms possibly
may develop or inspire innovations that create new markets or im-
prove the economic performance of existing ones.
Without clear answers to these critical questions of market dy-
namics,3 0 7 courts must face their own limitations. Forced by their
own jurisdiction to choose between permitting or forbidding the
challenged activity despite their uncertainty about the economic
effects that will result, courts have been especially aware of the
possibility that an iU-advised or inept attempt to limit predation
may present its own dangers to competition. Courts, for example,
1
306. Compare, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 74, at 180-89 with In re Borden, Inc.
(ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669, 805 n.39 (1978) appeal docketed, No. 79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
1979).
307. Although resolving these types of issues is in large part the province of the anti-
trust scholars and industrial organization economists, see part II supra, their conclusions
are hardly dispositive. Indeed, the current status of the scholarly debate over predation
sometimes seems most aptly described by Duggan's Law: "To every Ph.D there is an equal
and opposite Ph.D." P. DICKSON, THE OFFICIAL RULEs 41 (1978).
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display substantial deference both to innovators and to firms that
have developed their respective industries.308 Similarly, the pros-
pect of large treble damage awards seems to have diminished the
sympathies of some district courts toward plaintiffs.3 0 9 Thus,
courts generally are reluctant to risk inhibiting a dominant firm's
operations unless both the need for such action and the method for
accomplishing it are clear.
To some extent, plaintiffs are faced with a dilemma. The cases
suggest that competitively unsuccessful plaintiffs may bear an ad-
ditional, unspoken burden of demonstrating that they are not just
blaming others for their own failings.3 10 Although some courts have
recognized that under the proper circumstances a strong dominant
firm might be able successfully to engage in predation against even
a more efficient challenger, '31 1 courts are wary of protecting the in-
efficiencies of disgruntled challengers at the expense of proven en-
terprises. On the other hand, courts also are suspicious of firms
that maintain a profit and at the same time allege predation.3 1 2
Although Utah Pie unambiguously contemplated the possible co-
existence of predation and positive earnings,313 some district courts
apparently have assumed that the absence of failure implies the
absence of predation. 4
308. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281-83 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F.
Supp. 965, 982 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980); In re
DuPont de Nemours, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,770, at 21,977-78 (1980).
309. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 1013-14 (D. Conn. 1978),
aff'd, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 102 S. Ct. 85 (1981) (No. 80-
2092); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. (Memorex) v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 434-36
(N.D. Cal. 1978), afl'd per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3126 (1981).
310. See, e.g., Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 669-70 (9th Cir.
1980); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1074 (1977); Flair Zipper Corp. v. Textron Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. 1 63,555, at 76,958
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
311. See, e.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade
Cas. 1 63,947, at 75,889-90 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481
F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980).
312. See, e.g., Co-Opportunities, Inc. v. NBC, 510 F. Supp. 43, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Hoyt Heater Co. v. American- Appliance Mfg. Co., 502 F. Supp. 1383, 1390 (N.D. Cal. 1980);
Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 478 F. Supp. 589, 600-01 (D. Hawaii
1979), afl'd per curiam, 649 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1981); Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 1979-1
Trade Cas. 62,498, at 76,912-13 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
313. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967).
314. See note 312 supra. This assumption, however, may be too narrow, since the pur-
pose of predation may not always be to deter entry or induce market exit. Instead, preda-
tion may serve as a signal or threat that the targeted party should be more cooperative. For
example, if firm A tries to encroach on firm B's strong market, firm B, rather than-or in
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Despite this judicial caution in redressing claims of predation,
courts generally have inquired beyond strictly price/cost relation-
ships. As noted previously, courts and economists apparently be-
lieve that the competitive dangers of a dominant firm's response to
entry are few if the barriers to entry are low.-15 Precisely how
courts will treat cases in which entry barriers are high is still un-
certain, since no judicial opinion has found them to exist. 16 In
general, however, courts do perceive a greater competitive threat in
these situations than do Areeda and Turner, who intend their pro-
posal to apply regardless of the height of the industry barriers317
In addition to examining entry barriers, courts also are recog-
nizing strategic market considerations as important to evaluating
the dangers to competition from predation. A few recent opinions
have indicated that the interrelationships among markets can pro-
vide a strategic lever for competitive advantage, particularly when
a monopolistic supplier in one market is a competitor in another.318
Moreover, at least one court has noted that a firm's reputation as a
addition to-resisting in its own market, might well choose to commit predation in firm A's
stronghold. This action might effectively signal to firm A that B fears a competitive, mutual
self-destruction and would prefer to proceed-or to return-to a more cooperative relation-
ship in which each party respects the other's sphere of influence. Professor Porter refers to
such a strategy as a "cross-parry." M. PoRTER, supra note 268, at 84-85 (1980).
The predatory conduct also may put an entrant or maverick rival on notice that it
either should cooperate with industry-wide, supracompetitive pricing or face the prospect of
an expensive competitive war of attrition. In either instance the predation need only
threaten-not eliminate-the victim's earnings. Cf. notes 25-31 supra and accompanying
text (effects of imperfect information).
315. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. Even in the recent Northeastern
Telephone case, which is one of the strictest circuit court applications of the Areeda/Turner
test, the court considered the issue of entry barriers. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co.,
651 F.2d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-
1079). Although it found entry barriers to be low, the Second Circuit noted that this fact did
not completely eliminate the possibility of predation. Therefore, the court proceeded to re-
view the specific conduct under challenge. Id. at 93-95.
316. The Federal Trade Commission, however, found in Borden that the respondent's
ReaLemon trademark was so well established and highly promoted that it did constitute a
barrier to entry. In re Borden Inc. (ReaLemon), 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), appeal docketed, No.
79-3028 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1979).
317. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, § 714c. Interestingly, the selected cases
reflect little of the controversy that exists among economists about the nature and existence
of entry barriers. The courts usually simply assume that entry barriers may be a significant
factor. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1992) (No. 81-1079); International Air Indus., Inc.
v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943
(1976).
318. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1981).
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predator-whether justified or not-effectively may deter competi-
tion from equally efficient, potential rivals. 19 Nevertheless, the
strategic implications of business conduct remain largely uncertain.
Consequently, the only lasting inference to be drawn from the
courts' attention to strategic and entry barrier considerations in
assessing the dangers to competition may be that factors other
than cost/price relationships will be held to be relevant to such an
assessment. Still, many courts at the moment seem to feel that the
competitive dangers of predation are greatest when entry barriers
are high and strategic considerations are plainly operative.
C. Administrability
Assuming that predation occurs more than rarely and that it
sometimes presents a significant competitive danger, courts must
decide what to do about it. Of course, they may decide to do noth-
ing; they may fear, as discussed above, that inexpert judicial inter-
vention into the market will cause more problems than it will cure,
possibly by sheltering inefficient firms, discouraging innovation, or
chilling valuable and informative promotional campaigns.3 20 As-
suming, however, that courts are faced with situations which re-
quire intervention often enough to warrant some general rule, the
ideal would be a standard that is sufficiently sensitive to distin-
guish between economically desirable and undesirable conduct, but
which also is clear and simple enough that courts and business
managers can apply it accurately and with a minimum of ex-
pense. 21 The courts recognize both these goals, as well as the natu-
ral tendency for conflict between the two. Consequently, the cases
reflect an ongoing tension between bright-line, per se approaches
and a broader, rule of reason analysis.
While cost-based tests are clearly the accepted foundation for
analysis, the prevailing trend among courts is to augment this
analysis with additional considerations.2 2 Thus, one promised vir-
319. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 988-90 (N.D. Cal.
1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1981). See also F.T.C. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
320. See notes 306-09 supra and accompanying text.
321. Of course, part of the ideal is also that the standard as applied should not have
deleterious side-effects. This point, however, was addressed in the previous discussion of the
harm to competition from efforts to prevent and redress predation. See notes 306-19 supra
and accompanying text.
322. The tendency of courts to balance the stringency of the definition chosen for one
of the elements of liability and damages against the stringency of the definitions chosen for
the other elements may well be contributing toward the movement of courts away from rigid
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tue of the Areeda/Turner test-simplicity-has been elusive in the
courtroom. 323 Whereas Areeda and Turner discourage analysis of
entry barriers and assessment of long-term considerations,
24
courts nonetheless have undertaken the former and therefore have
opened the door to the latter. Areeda and Turner also suggest that
average variable cost may be computed without undue difficulty.325
As litigators gain experience with cost-based tests and concentrate
their efforts on this critical issue, however, they probably will seek
to discover fully and then reconstruct in court the defendant's
complete cost accounts. 26 Moreover, even under the most basic
cost/price test, questions of allocation and measurement poten-
adherence to bright-line standards for predatory pricing. This trend also may be one factor
that has allowed the courts to remain as responsive as they have been to the flurry of analy-
sis that presently is occurring.
323. The courts in both Transamerica and Richter explicitly state that the Areeda/
Turner standard is not as easy to apply as it initially appears to be. Richter Concrete Corp.
v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. 63,947, at 79,885-87 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), appeal dock-
eted, No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980). See also Greer, supra note 53, at 238-52.
324. Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 896-97.
325. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 57, at 1345-47, 1351-52.
326. In Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
appeal docketed No. 80-4048 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1980), plaintiff asked the court to reallocate
certain of defendant's expenses, in effect raising defendant's cost figures for some of its
products. Id. at 998-1001. The court relied heavily upon the consistency of defendant's ac-
counting methodology over time to reject plaintiff's claims that defendant's books and profit
projections understated its costs. Id. Although the court ultimately accepted the regularity
of defendant's accounts, the court and the parties appear to have devoted a substantial
amount of time to these issues at trial and in pretrial proceedings. See Transamerica Com-
puter Co. v. IBM Corp., 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also California Computer
Prods., Inc. (CalComp) v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 740 n.19 (9th Cir. 1979); Island Tobacco
Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 726 (D. Hawaii 1981).
Recent court of appeals' opinions also raise two other points about the treatment of
accounting issues in predatory pricing cases. In Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel
Serv., 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit stated that the plaintiff bears the
burden of assembling and presenting cost data that support its pricing allegations. Id. at
131. The court held that the plaintiff must supply sufficient proof to enable the factfinder to
make "a careful assessment of the relationship between the defendants' prices and costs."
Id.
In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th
Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that "the determination of fixed and variable costs is a
matter for the jury under appropriate instructions." Id. at 942. This holding thus gives the
jury a potentially significant role in deciding how the defendant's costs are to be calcu-
lated-an important step in assessing the defendant's liability under cost-based pricing
tests. In reaching this conclusion, the court declined to follow "the recommendation of
Professors Areeda and Turner that such categories [of fixed and variable costs] be fixed to
avoid case-by-case dispute," notwithstanding the "administrative convenience" such an ap-
proach might offer. Id. at 941 & n.38. See also Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co.,
633 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tially raise myriad theoretical and factual problems that are inher-
ent in defining the relevant product market, geographic market,
and time frame. The courts, therefore, may find that using the in-
formation elicited on these issues to seek a fuller understanding of
other issues presents little increased difficulty. Regardless of the
reason, courts typically have extended their analyses beyond pure
cost/price relationships to consider evidence and arguments re-
garding intent, entry barriers, market structure and conditions,
comparative efficiencies, and the strategic implications of the de-
fendant's conduct.
3 27
Despite the presence of these additional considerations, no
published opinion has adopted a pure, unbounded rule of reason
approach. The court in Berkey, for example, feared that placing
some nonspecific duty upon Kodak to predisclose its new product
introductions would not give Kodak adequate guidance regarding
the exact nature and extent of product changes covered by the
duty, the extent of the information that had to be supplied, or the
time requirements for supplying it.32 8 Similarly, while a firm may
find it difficult to determine exactly when its price dips below aver-
age variable cost, a standard that includes other factors as well
could be even more difficult for firms to follow. 3 29 If businesses
cannot predict the application of predation rules to their activities,
they may either retreat from vigorous competition or find that the
risk of litigation jeopardizes their rewards for such aggressiveness.
Nevertheless, courts generally seem to find an analysis that is more
complex than pure cost/price margins-an approach more in line
327. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th
Cir. 1980) (strategic implications of a defendant's conduct), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921
(1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 285-91 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. Empire Gas.Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 299-302 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 112 (1976); Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp.
1272, 1286-89 (E.D. Pa.) (intent), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979); Weber v. Wynne, 431
F. Supp. 1048, 1060 (D.N.J. 1977) (comparative efficiencies); Inter City Oil Co. v. Murphy
Oil Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. % 60,948, at 69,189 (D. Minn. 1976) (entry barriers).
328. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The court in Berkey, however, did go so far as to con-
demn Kodak for preventing a joint venturer from disclosing the nature of the flashlamp
upon which they were working, a view that Justice Rehnquist later criticized. See note 239
supra.
329. See, e.g., Schmalensee, supra note 23, at 1028-29 (commenting on Scherer's pro-
posed multiple-factor analysis of predatory pricing). Courts have not yet attempted to apply
proposals suggesting restriction of a dominant firm's output in the face of new entry, see
Williamson, supra note 21, at 284-86, nor have they attempted to prevent incumbents from




with most economists' proposals-to be both administrable and
consistent with their own sense of where the greatest dangers to
competition lie.
V. CONCLUSION
Firm conclusions remain elusive. Although some trends are
now evident, the jurisprudential and theoretical tensions remain
and will continue to result in the refinement of judicial inquiry and
analysis. For the present, however, there are still relatively clear,
almost per se, protections for innovation. By contrast, no specifi-
cally formulated test for predatory promotion has gained ascen-
dancy, and, therefore, the rule of reason prevails. Judicial treat-
ment of pricing has been moving toward a hybrid solution, with
one presumption against pricing below marginal cost, another in
favor of pricing at or above average total cost, and a limited rule of
reason analysis for pricing between marginal cost and average total
cost. This hybrid approach has appeal because it reduces the range
of situations that require complicated analysis, but allows fuller
analysis in borderline cases. As economists, courts, and commenta-
tors expand their understanding of competitive relationships and
behavior, they undoubtedly will reduce the range of uncertainty
still further and single out more precisely the cases presenting the
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C012, K3 , P,
WW3.', AAA.
R, EE, II, JJ1 ,
00, TT, VVI
The categories "plaintiff won" and "defendant won" indicate which side substantially
prevailed on the central predation issues before the court. The following are notes that clar-
ify the classification of cases which might fall into more than one category.
1. Plaintiff also alleged predatory promotion.
2. Berkey and Northeastern are treated as nonjury verdicts for defendants because
the court of appeals in both cases reversed, without remand, the principal predation-based
verdicts for plaintiff. In each case the appellate court remanded some predation issues for
further consideration. These issues are still before the respective trial courts.
3. Currently on appeal.
4. Plaintiff attacked Xerox's accumulation of patents and refusal to grant licenses.
The jury rejected some of SCM's predation claims, and the trial judge ruled that plaintiff
could not recover any damages. Plaintiff has sought Supreme Court review of the Second
Circuit's ruling on damages.
5. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's
predatory pricing claims. The trial is proceeding on defendant's alleged use of territorial
restrictions.
6. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. At the same
time, the court also denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's pricing
claims.
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7. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's
federal antitrust claims.
8. The court of appeals reversed, without remand, the trial court's judgment for
plaintiff.
9. Important predatory pricing allegations are also at issue.
10. Important predatory product design allegations and other innovation issues are also
at issue.
11. The court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
12. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal of defen-
dant's counterclaim that plaintiff had engaged in below cost pricing.

